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Europe and the world face a series of challenges including resource degradation, climate change, and 
a global economic crisis. Due to their integrated nature, 
they must be tackled at once, as one. The quest for an eco-
efficient economy is about simultaneously addressing 
these challenges through an integrated policy agenda 
for climate change mitigation, resource efficiency, 
industrial renewal and innovation, and competitiveness. 
The aim is to exploit synergies and minimise trade-offs 
to help economic recovery while embarking on a more 
sustainable economic development path. 
This report is not just about challenges. It also describes 
the opportunities for Europe to become a leader in the 
global transformation to an eco-efficient economy. 
It discusses the imperative for this transformation, 
examines achievements and on-going efforts, and 
advances a set of agenda items for political discussion. 
Important lessons and good examples are available in 
many sectors, including “new” ones such as renewable 
electricity and biofuels for transport, cross-cutting 
ones such as sustainable cities and energy efficiency, 
and in traditional sectors such as heating, iron & steel, 
chemicals and automotive. The eco-efficient economy is 
not only about stimulating new eco-innovation; mature 
sectors retain very critical roles for employment and the 
economy, and for resolving environmental problems.
Europe’s leadership is evident primarily in its climate 
change mitigation commitments, as well as governance 
initiatives in areas such as energy efficiency and 
sustainable industrial policy, but improvements can 
be made in fostering innovation and efficiency. There 
is potential for Europe to remain an attractive place 
for investment and industry while pursuing an eco-
efficient economic strategy focusing on governance for 
innovation and industrial renewal. But efforts must be 
intensified. 
How can EU policy makers step up efforts to foster 
a European eco-efficient economy over the coming 
years? Three strategic areas should be in focus:
Resource systems efficiency• , in particular energy 
efficiency and sustainable city planning including 
infrastructure improvements and transport solutions 
– this has a direct political and economic appeal in 
present times of economic crisis.
New technology markets,•  including sustainable 
transportation and renewable and other carbon-
neutral energies – these sectors need transforming, 
as they are the major contributors to climate change 
and resource degradation today.
Global carbon pricing• , to incentivise markets for 
investment and consumption – this is the single 
strongest policy action and unavoidable to yield 
eco-efficient development globally in the long 
term.
It is technically possible as well as economically viable 
to pursue these strategies towards far-reaching climate, 
resource and development objectives. However, they 
are by no means automatic or easy. To the contrary 
they require profound policy actions and behavioural 
responses by companies and consumers – globally. 
A first necessary step is to initiate political debates 
at national, European and global levels, about how 
governance systems can be orchestrated to facilitate 
these strategies. Several linked policy agendas must be 
pursued. 
Adapting governance to innovation pathways• : 
This concerns how to govern a transition to an 
economy based more on innovation and intensified 
knowledge input, which requires adapting 
governance measures to innovation systems and 
technology characteristics, and enhancing the use 
of hybrid governance and policy packages.
International cooperation and carbon pricing• : 
Because Europe’s economy (and climate) is 
interwoven with the rest of the world, international 
cooperation and global deals are absolutely central 
in the pursuit of the eco-efficient economy. Major 
challenges are ahead – both in following through on 
domestic commitments despite the economic crisis, 
and in reaching comprehensive global commitments 
through the international frameworks. This entails 
vigorously pursuing a stepwise global expansion 
of carbon pricing and related means such as 
developments of standards, R&D and early market 
support, trade policy, and technical cooperation.
exeCutive summary
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A systems approach for informed policy debates: Policy 
makers’ knowledge about how the eco-efficient economy 
can be governed is fragmented today. The agenda is 
complex and interconnected, and new systems analysis 
tools are needed to provide knowledge for informed 
decision making. This involves both developing 
new and better systems approaches to understanding 
technological innovation and combined policy impacts, 
and developing new platforms for evidence-based 
policy debates at national and European levels.
Summing up these agenda items, a six-point action plan 
is proposed.
The EU needs to step up programmed 1. 
interventions to induce development and 
diffusion of specific technologies alongside more 
generic policies. 
The EU needs to develop more hybrid and 2. 
combined governance arrangements.
The EU needs to continue pushing forward the 3. 
development of a global price on greenhouse gas 
emissions.
The EU needs to assist and induce emerging 4. 
economies to make substantive commitments.
The EU needs, even more forcefully, to make 5. 
policy assessments and other forms of evidence 
gathering routine. 
The EU needs to develop institutional platforms 6. 
where the evidence can be taken up, interpreted 
and learned from.
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Foreword
A European Eco-efficient Economy has been prepared as 
a background report for the 2009 Swedish Presidency of 
the Council of the European Union. It forms a common 
basis for discussions at the informal ministerial 
meetings of the Council dealing with energy (July), 
environment (July) and competitiveness (October). The 
objective is to facilitate the alignment and coordination 
of these meetings’ policy agendas, which range from 
climate change and energy efficiency, to innovation, 
competitiveness and employment. As will be shown, 
these agendas are highly connected and the European 
eco-efficient economy is an attempt to encapsulate them 
in an integrated way.
The study has been commissioned by the Swedish 
Government and carried out by analysts at the Stockholm 
Environment Institute (SEI) and Lund University. It 
has benefited from the advice and support of an inter-
ministerial steering group with representatives from 
the Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of 
Enterprise, Energy and Communications. However, 
the report does not necessarily represent positions or 
view points of the Swedish government. The authors 
are solely responsible for  the analysis, proposals 
and opinions presented, as well as any omissions and 
mistakes therein. Dr. Måns Nilsson of SEI directed 
the study. Primary authors for case studies are: Karin 
Ericsson (heating), Lars J Nilsson (biofuels; energy 
efficiency), Måns Nilsson (renewables), Björn Nykvist 
(automotive), Clarisse Kehler Siebert (chemicals) and 
Annika Varnäs (steel; sustainable cities).
The study team has drawn upon input and advice 
from a reference group including representatives 
from the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 
the Swedish Governmental Agency for Innovation 
Systems (VINNOVA), the Swedish Energy Agency, 
Lund University and Linköping University. In addition, 
industrial associations and environmental NGOs in 
Sweden and Europe, and staff members of the European 
Commission, have commented on draft versions. The 
study team would like to thank the Steering Group 
and Reference Group for their helpful comments and 
input, as well as all commentators in Sweden and 
internationally who provided helpful suggestions and 
comments on the final draft. 
Stockholm, May 2009
Måns Nilsson, also on behalf of the whole study team
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1 introduCtion
Climate change and fossil fuel dependency have taken a central stage in European and international politics 
in recent years. This has occurred in an increasingly 
globalised and competitive world – one faced with 
daunting social, political and economic challenges. The 
recent financial crisis and ensuing economic recession 
has put additional pressure on European leaders to stake 
out the way towards an economic development that is 
able to induce investment and job creation and generate 
welfare, while proactively dealing with increasing and 
sharply fluctuating energy and raw material prices, 
mitigating the threat of climate change, reversing natural 
resource degradation, and responding to increasing 
global industrial competition. This is what the quest for 
a European eco-efficient economy is about. It engages a 
range of policy areas that need to talk much more with 
each other than they do today, and envelops a common 
understanding of the integrated nature of the challenges 
ahead. The hypothesis is that such an integrated view 
presents opportunities and synergies that today are only 
partially captured in European governance. Leading the 
global efforts to combat climate change and resource 
degradation at the same time as enhancing Europe’s 
competitiveness requires developments in technology 
and new directions in innovation. It also involves a 
stronger horizontal coordination if not integration of 
several important policy agendas at European and 
national levels, as well as coordination with and between 
EU’s external policies, including climate change 
negotiations, neighbourhood policy, and trade, which 
so far have been treated largely in isolation. However, 
the opportunity for achieving a European eco-efficient 
economy is also shaped by a range of external driving 
forces, only partly affected by policy, such as energy 
prices, consumer preferences, and global economic 
growth.
EuRoPE AS A lEADER FoR An ECo-
EFFICIEnt EConomy
The EU has established itself as an international leader in 
the mitigation of climate change as well as in managing 
other global environmental issues. For good reasons, 
the EU is eager to retain this role. Through continuing 
and revamping its “soft” leadership strategy, Europe 
can – by example, diplomacy, and persuasion in areas 
such as climate change policies – not only become more 
eco-efficient itself, but also pull the global community 
towards a more eco-efficient economic development. 
The climate and energy package agreed in 2008 is 
an example of an initiative with significant potential 
for leadership by example. Why should Europe lead 
the global climate agenda? At least four strategic 
motives may underpin this leadership aspiration. First, 
climate policy has developed into an important driver 
of European integration overall, and to take on such 
important challenges in a proactive way has proven 
to enhance the legitimacy of the European institutions 
in general among its Member States and populations. 
Second, the question of future supply security for 
energy is intensifying, which reinforces important parts 
of the climate policy agenda. Energy imports are on the 
rise, and oil and gas prices are unstable. Strategies for 
energy efficiency and renewable energy promotion will 
help Europe secure its energy supply. Third, the EU’s 
strong global voice on multilateralism internationally 
plays well into the climate change agenda, as being 
particularly suited for multilateral action.1 Fourth, 
leadership on climate change and coupled issues of 
the eco-efficient economy could, if done right, spur 
innovation that enhances Europe’s long-term job 
creation and global competitiveness.
The Lisbon agenda set forth in 2000 was an early 
attempt to put measures in place that would make 
the EU the most competitive economy in the world.2 
The first Swedish presidency of the Council (in 2001) 
also included initiatives in this direction, for instance 
through work on chemicals policy, integrated product 
policy, and sustainable development strategies. Further 
important political initiatives for an eco-efficient 
economy were taken during the Dutch (2004) and 
German (2007) presidencies, both of which examined 
the case for promoting sustainable innovations and green 
1 Oberthür, S. and C. R. Kelly (2008). “EU leadership 
in international climate policy: achievements and chal-
lenges.” The International Spectator 43(3): 35-50.
2 The EU sustainable development strategy adjacent to 
the Lisbon agenda sets overall objectives for seven key 
priority areas – climate change and clean energy; sustain-
able transport; conservation and management of natural 
resources; public health; social inclusion, demography 
and migration; and global poverty and sustainable devel-
opment challenges.
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technologies as an important overall strategy for Europe. 
Ideas about the need for a “new industrial revolution” 
were also aired in the European Commission’s first 
strategic energy review of 2005. More recently, the 
Commission’s High-level Group on Competitiveness, 
Energy and the Environment made further advances 
in developing an integrated agenda.3 This report will 
continue to build up the case for an integrated agenda 
for energy, environment and industrial policy in Europe. 
It sets out to explain and demonstrate how, in particular, 
climate change mitigation can be combined with strong 
economic performance, while recognising that this 
pursuit is neither straightforward nor uncontroversial. 
A global transition to a low carbon economy in order 
to tackle climate change presents a major opportunity 
for all countries to embark on cleaner development. 
However, there are strong – and legitimate – concerns 
that climate change mitigation may, if not appropriately 
designed, hamper economic growth, competitiveness 
and jobs in Europe, in particular in sectors that are 
energy-intensive, export-oriented and subject to 
unilateral policies. According to this logic, not only 
would European industries be hurt, but there is a further 
risk that the efforts will have no effect on climate change 
mitigation due to carbon leakage – as production moves 
to other countries, and imports increase so that no or 
negative carbon savings are achieved.4 However, there 
is evidence that efficiency enhancements at systems 
levels are largely untapped in many sectors, suggesting 
that large parts of the climate mitigation agenda can 
be achieved at negative or low cost.5 Furthermore, 
environmental regulation and policies oriented towards 
3 CEC (2007a). First report of the high level group on 
Competitiveness, Energy and the Environment: Function-
ing of the energy market, access to energy , energy effi-
ciency and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. Brussels, 
European Commission.
4 Carbon leakage is defined as the increase in emissions 
outside a region as a direct result of the policy to cap 
emission in this region. Carbon leakage means that the 
domestic climate mitigation policy is less effective and 
more costly in containing emission levels, a legitimate 
concern for policy-makers. (Source IEA; 2008: Issues 
behind competitiveness and carbon leakage – focus on 
heavy industry)
5 McKinsey (2008). Pathways to a low-carbon economy: 
Version 2 of the global greenhouse gas abatement cost 
curve, McKinsey & Co.
developing more eco-efficient technologies can actually 
contribute to growth and competitiveness, by catalysing 
European companies into becoming leaders in new 
markets and technologies, and developing new service 
sectors. The 2008 European Innovation Scoreboard 
shows that the EU is in many ways on the right track 
and catching up with main rivals such as US and Japan. 
Still, challenges persist in areas such as the business 
investment climate and bringing innovation systems 
thinking to R&D efforts.6 An important adjacent agenda 
is to improve regulation and alleviate the administrative 
burden for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
in Europe, even as efforts for environmental and climate 
governance are stepped up. EU countries have a strong 
position in several new technology areas and have the 
potential to maintain a leading position in these areas, 
along with coupled services sectors. Recent examples can 
be found, for instance, in energy systems optimisation 
and efficiency, combined heat and power technologies, 
wind and solar energy, automotive, waste management, 
and water management. Further efforts are advanced 
through new demand-side governance initiatives such 
as the European Lead Market Initiative7, which aims to 
foster innovation-friendly market framework conditions 
through standardisation, labelling and procurement 
measures. 
thE EConomIC CRISIS AlSo An 
oPPoRtunIty
At the same time as it is pursuing this leadership 
role, Europe is facing important structural and policy 
challenges, amplified by the recent economic turmoil 
and signals of a serious recession. Periods of economic 
downturn are known to turn political attention away 
from long-term issues to more immediate concerns such 
as budgets, employment and social welfare. However, 
as President Barroso along with many Heads of State 
have noted, the economic downturn does not in any 
way diminish the need for concerted action towards 
climate change mitigation. In fact, to pursue climate 
strategies in the context of an eco-efficient economy 
can be an opportunity for economic recovery through, 
for instance, its potential for cost savings, job creation, 
6 CEC (2009a). 2008 European Innovation Scoreboard. 
Brussels, European Commission.
7 CEC (2007c). Lead Markets for Europe. Brussels, Euro-
pean Commission.
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efficiency enhancements and new systems solutions 
and business models. 
As the recent financial crisis has slowed economic 
activity throughout the world, governments are turning 
to new spending. Herein lies a grand opportunity 
– through promoting and spending on for instance 
green cars, efficient appliances, infrastructure, better 
insulation, more efficient lighting, better public 
transport, and alternative energy. The Commission has 
also identified the current crisis as an opportunity which 
brings with it the significant public-private investment 
synergies necessary for climate change mitigation, 
and objectives such as innovation, growth and jobs.8 
The World Economic Forum has further pointed to the 
need for fiscal stimulus to multi-task – that is, creating 
jobs and economic growth at the same time as moving 
investments towards, for instance, sustainable energy 
systems.9 The Commission’s Economic Recovery 
Plan10 agreed in 2008 sets out fiscal stimulus packages 
along with investments in infrastructure and green 
technologies, for instance in the car industry:“Smart 
investments in tomorrow’s skills and technologies will 
accelerate Europe’s drive under the Lisbon Growth and 
Jobs Strategy to become a dynamic low-carbon economy 
for the 21st century” (President Barroso’s speech at the 
press conference). Synergies with a green policy agenda 
are visible also on the revenue side, where the European 
Emissions Trading System (ETS) and similar schemes 
are expected to generate significant public value: under 
full auctioning, the annual revenue under the ETS is 
estimated at over €30 billion annually11.
That the eco-efficient economy agenda is a hot one 
internationally is clear in the recent proliferation of 
books and conferences on this theme; e.g. “A Green 
8 CEC (2009b). Communication: Towards a comprehen-
sive climate change agreement in Copenhagen. Brussels, 
European Commission.
9 World Economic Forum (2009). Clean investing: toward 
a clean energy infrastructure. Geneva, World Economic 
Forum.
10  CEC (2008b). Communication: A European Economic 
Recovery Plan. Brussels, European Commission.
11  Egenhofer, C. (2008). “Climate change policy after the 
financial crisis: the latest excuse for a new round of state 
aid?” CEPS Commentary: 30 October 2008.
New Deal”12, “The Green Collar Economy”13, and 
“Strategies for the Green Economy”14. In October 2008, 
UNEP launched their “Green Economy Initiative” 
comprising three pillars - valuing and mainstreaming 
nature’s services into national and international accounts; 
employment generation through green jobs; and laying 
out the policies, instruments and market signals able to 
accelerate a transition to a Green Economy.15 In March 
2009, UNEP’s chief Achim Steiner proposed a “Global 
Green New Deal” whereby investing a significant 
amount of the $3 trillion-worth of stimulus packages 
would be invested in areas such as buildings’ energy 
efficiency, renewable energy, and sustainable transport. 
This represents a true opportunity to make the transition 
to a low-carbon and resource-efficient society.16
That the eco-efficient economy agenda has a strong 
connection to these short-term economic recovery 
concerns highlights an important time dimension, where 
short-term action items are linked to the need to enable 
different actors to harvest the “low-hanging fruits”, such 
as energy end-use efficiency enhancements, and use the 
current imperative for fiscal stimulus as an engine for 
eco-efficiency.17 However, in the longer term the agenda 
is linked to much more fundamental socio-technical 
change, involving the EU’s active promotion of the 
development, diffusion and use of the next generation 
of technologies. The eco-efficient economy agenda 
also has an international dimension, as Europe’s own 
emissions of greenhouse gases only constitute about 13 
per cent of the global total, and also because European 
industries in most sectors must be able to compete 
globally. There is no doubt that the competition for jobs 
will continue globally, and Europe has the choice and 
12  New Economics Foundation (2008). A Green New Deal: 
Joined-up policies to solve the triple crunch of the credit 
crisis, climate change and high oil price. London, NEF.
13  Jones, V. (2008). The Green Collar Economy: How One 
Solution Can Fix Our Two Biggest Problems, HarperCol-
lins.
14  Makower, J. (2008). Strategies for the Green Economy: 
Opportunities and Challenges in the New World of Busi-
ness, McGraw Hill.
15  http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/
16  Barbier, E. (2009). A Global Green New Deal. Nairobi, 
UNEP.
17  Edenhofer, O. and N. Stern (2009). Towards a Global 
Green Recovery. Berlin, Potsdam Institute.
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opportunity to become the leading new market for eco-
efficient products and services.
Many international agreements are part of the overall 
governance framework of the eco-efficient economy 
agenda. These go beyond the global climate negotiations 
and touch upon agendas such as technology cooperation 
and standards, R&D support, development assistance, 
diplomatic networks and trade. A closer coordination or 
integration of these agendas, for instance, by integrating 
trade provisions in a new climate deal is under debate. 
In this context, it is recognised that trade provisions 
and penalties in climate policy would, for example, 
not necessarily violate World Trade Organization 
regulations. However, the trade agenda in relation to the 
eco-efficient economy agenda constantly risks capture 
by protectionist interests, and it is necessary to establish 
agreed principles for what constitutes legitimate trade 
provisions. In a recent report on environmental effects 
of international trade, Harvard economist Jeffrey 
Frankel suggests that border measures are possible 
under the condition that they follow multi-laterally 
agreed guidelines, that judgments about things such as 
e.g. carbon content are made by independent panels of 
experts, that measures are applied only to countries that 
are not participating in the UNFCCC protocol, and that 
penalties are directed only to few of the most fossil-
intense industries, such as aluminium, steel, paper, glass 
and chemicals.18
The transitioning toward the European eco-efficient 
economy presents opportunities and win-win situations 
as well as challenges and policy dilemmas. Current 
political disagreements in the face of economic problems 
reinforce the need for a joint European vision of an eco-
efficient economy. In this report our central objectives 
are to discuss the challenges and opportunities for an 
eco-efficient European economy, learn lessons from 
different sectors’ efforts and achievements, and draw 
out the implications for European governance towards 
an eco-efficient economy. The report will not make 
specific recommendations, either on specific policy 
instruments or on particular technologies, but it will 
suggest key strategic areas and a set of agenda items for 
further political discussions. 
18  Frankel, J. (2009). Environmental effects of international 
trade: expert report to Sweden’s globalisation council. 
Stockholm, Regeringskansliet.
Below we discuss some of the terms upon which the 
eco-efficient economy concept is formulated. 
ECo-EFFICIEnCy At thE EConomy-wIDE 
lEvEl
Eco-efficiency was coined by the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development in its 1992 
publication, “Changing Course”.19 There it is portrayed 
as a strategy for enhanced competitiveness of firms 
through environmental enhancements: creating more 
goods and services while using fewer resources, 
and creating less waste and pollution. This leads to 
reductions in environmental costs, greater resource 
efficiency, and improvements in image for businesses, 
and comes about through processes such as resource 
optimisation, waste recycling and new services. The 
term has become synonymous with a management 
philosophy used primarily in the enterprise context 
(i.e. at the micro-level). Currently, an ISO standard is 
being developed for how to measure and evaluate eco-
efficiency in products and processes.
In this report, we adapt this primarily enterprise-
related and micro-level concept to the economy-
wide (macro) level, where the eco-efficient economy 
concept encapsulates an integrated view of economic 
and environmental performance and a dynamic 
change process in the European economy as a whole. 
We zoom in on climate change and resource use in 
the environmental dimension, and do not explicitly 
account for a broader range of environmental problems 
(although many of these are correlated to climate and 
resource use). The theoretical basis for the concept of 
an “eco-efficient economy” is of course different from 
the conventional firm-level connotation. This broader, 
economy-wide concept can be situated theoretically 
within the literature on ecological modernisation20, 
within which we highlight four key themes21:
19  WBCSD (1992). Changing Course - a global business 
perspective on development and the environment. Cam-
bridge MA, MIT Press.
20  Hajer, M. (1995). The Politics of Environmental Dis-
course: Ecological Modernisation and the Policy Proc-
ess. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
21  Baker, S. and K. Eckerberg, Eds. (2008). In Pursuit of 
Sustainable Development: new governance practices at 
the sub-national level in Europe. London, Routledge.
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that there can be synergy between economic growth • 
and environmental protection, not least through 
enhanced energy and resource efficiency;
that there is integration of environmental policy • 
concerns into mainstream economic policy areas;
that there are new instruments and actor roles • 
to influence economic activities, broadening the 
spectrum from public policy to governance; and,
that there are efforts for invention, innovation and • 
diffusion of more eco-efficient socio-technical 
systems in the economy.
The eco-efficient economic agenda thus entails an 
integrated policy response to several traditionally 
separate policy agendas, including climate change 
mitigation, sustainable energy use, resource productivity 
and efficiency, economic growth and job creation, 
innovation, and competitiveness. Furthermore, it 
touches on international cooperation policies including 
trade policy, foreign policy and development policy. 
An eco-efficient economy is one which simultaneously 
achieves positive outcomes on all these agendas by 
exploiting the synergies between them and minimising 
the trade offs involved.
As a policy paper rather than a research report, it does 
not apply a strict analytical interpretation of the eco-
efficient economy. Efforts will be needed to evaluate 
contributions to or against the eco-efficient economy in 
more specific technology / policy assessment exercises 
(see Chapter 6). 22  
othER kEy tERmS AnD ConCEPtS
Below we introduce key terms and concepts that 
underpin the eco-efficient economy and are used 
frequently. The impatient reader may want to skip this 
somewhat theoretical account!
Innovation
The concept of innovation has won great approval 
over the last decade amongst analysts and policy 
22  Huppes, G. and M. Ishikawa (2009). “Eco-efficiency 
guiding micro-level actions towards sustainability: ten 
basic steps for analysis.” Ecological Economics 68: 1687-
1700.
makers concerned with economic change, industrial 
transformation and technological development. The 
relatively recent literature on innovation systems 
highlights the importance of actor networks and 
institutional arrangements for the development, 
diffusion and utilization of new technology. Its “socio-
technical” systems perspective recognizes that firms 
and technologies are part of wider social systems of 
actors, networks and institutions. In particular, it has 
been argued that the pursuit of sustainable development 
requires radical changes at the regime level – so 
called “transitions” – and that while these cannot be 
controlled, they can, to some extent, be governed by 
society.23 Different technologies go through different 
phases of maturity (although not necessarily in a linear 
way) from basic R&D, to experiments and technology 
specific R&D, to demonstration, to commercialisation, 
take off and market accumulation, and finally through 
to market maturity (see Figure 1). The innovation 
systems approach helps to identify key “functions” of 
innovation, which determine how well a technological 
system performs in development, diffusion and societal 
uptake of new technologies. Functions can be promoted 
through public policy as well as private-public 
governance arrangements, and of course through purely 
private-sector initiatives.24
23  Rotmans, J., R. Kemp, et al. (2001). “More evolution 
than revolution: transition management in public policy.” 
Foresight 3(1).
24  Bergek, A., S. Jacobsson, et al. (2008). “Analyzing the 
functional dynamics of technological innovation systems: 
A scheme of analysis.” Research Policy 37(3): 407-429.
Figure 1:  a stereotyped innovation pathway
System change
indicator
Basic R&D
Demo
Take-off
Commercialisation
Market accumulation
Market maturity
Time
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Competitiveness
Despite wide-spread use in policy discussions and 
research, “competitiveness” is not a straightforward 
easily defined concept. One may talk about 
competitiveness at the product or technological 
innovation systems level, at the company or industry 
level, and at the level of entire nations or regions. Value 
is created within enterprises. This process may be 
hindered or supported through the policies of the nation 
or region. Thus, competitiveness of nations deals with 
“how nations create and maintain an environment which 
sustains the competitiveness of its enterprises”.25 At the 
industry level, competitiveness is created by superior 
productivity, which may either arise from lower costs 
than rivals or the ability to offer the better product for a 
particular market. Therefore this is closely linked to the 
innovation capacity. At the economy-wide level, like 
for the firm level, it is often considered that the overall 
economy’s capacity to innovate is, together with things 
like education and political stability, an important long-
term determinant of competitiveness. Paul Krugman, a 
leading scholar in the field, has however long argued that 
competitiveness is not an ideal metaphor for countries 
or the EU. Europe is not in competition with the rest of 
the world, but European companies are.26 
There is often a fear that environmental regulation may 
hinder competitiveness. For situations where products, 
production processes and consumer preferences are 
fixed and where companies have already made their 
cost-minimising choices, increased environmental 
legislation leads to a higher cost-burden for companies. 
However, it has been argued that in many sectors, 
internationally competitive companies may not 
necessarily be those with the cheapest inputs or largest 
scale, but those that have the capacity to improve and 
innovate continually, based for instance on foresight 
into environmental challenges and future changes in 
attitudes and consumption patterns. Properly designed 
environmental legislation matching such developments 
may trigger innovations that can create competitive 
advantage. 
25  Porter, M. (1989). The Competitive advantage of nations. 
New York, Free Press. 
26  Krugman, P. (1994). “Competitiveness - a dangerous 
obsession.” Foreign Affairs March-April.
Decoupling
Decoupling as a concept originates in the world 
of physics, describing the generic phenomenon of 
disappearing interactions between physical objects. It is 
used routinely also in economics for considering whether 
for instance emerging and developing economies will 
follow the Western economies into recession or not. In 
the field of climate policy and eco-efficiency, the term 
however typically refers to the debate about whether the 
link can be broken between continued economic growth 
and environmental pressures. OECD defines decoupling 
thus: “Decoupling occurs when the growth rate of an 
environmental pressure is less than that of its economic 
driving force (e.g. GDP) over a given period. Decoupling 
can be either absolute or relative. Absolute decoupling is 
said to occur when the environmentally relevant variable 
is stable or decreasing while the economic driving force 
is growing. Decoupling is said to be relative when the 
growth rate of the environmentally relevant variable is 
positive, but less than the growth rate of the economic 
variable.”27
Policy coordination and integration
Integration of policy areas has been on the agenda for at 
least twenty years. One may here differentiate between 
policies aimed at the integration of environmental issues 
in sectoral policy making, so called Environmental 
Policy Integration (EPI) and more generally enhanced 
coordination / integration of policy making.28 Both have 
been subject to various initiatives at the European level. 
Apart from environmental concerns, a key motivation 
for integration is the concern that segmented and 
hierarchical institutions produce incoherent policies. 
The quest for more integrated public policies has gained 
increasing interest among governments around Europe, 
with programmes for “joined-up government” and 
other forms of joint decision making and consultation in 
the government offices. In the European Commission, 
policy coordination has been promoted under measures 
such as impact assessment and enhanced used of 
interservice consultation in the drafting of policies.
27  OECD (2002). Indicators to Measure Decoupling of 
Environmental Pressure from Economic Growth. Paris, 
OECD.
28  Nilsson, M. and K. Eckerberg, Eds. (2007). Environmen-
tal policy integration in practice: shaping institutions for 
learning. London, Earthscan.
swedish government offices/stockholm environment institute
7
In addition, many Member States’ work on sustainable 
development strategies, and new institutions and 
procedures for this, has helped to enhance policy 
integration and handle goal conflicts and synergies. All 
these have been useful steps towards better coordination. 
However, they appear insufficient to achieve integrated 
policy making. Policy coordination can be unpacked 
in different levels, where integration is the highest 
“level” of coordination (Figure 2). A most basic form of 
coordination is when actors consult other actors who may 
be affected by an initiative, in order to avoid advancing 
suggestions that will be unacceptable. Inter-service 
consultation is a typical example of such coordination. 
A more advanced form is the mutually recognising 
and purposeful search for common interests and 
strategies across sectors, which allows the simultaneous 
attainment of respective goals. Integration, finally is the 
most advanced level, entailing sectors developing joint 
problem understandings, goals and policy objectives. 
This report promotes such a process, advancing an 
integrated view on different policy sectors.
Figure 2:  Policy coordination and integration
Integrated
policy-making
Policy
coordination
Policy
co-operation
Joint new goals
and policy
Joint policy reaching
sectoral goals
More compatible
sectoral policies
Governance
Governance has become something of a catch-phrase 
in recent years, used in lieu of policy or government 
to highlight the fact that societal steering processes 
increasingly involves stakeholders other than the state, 
such as NGOs and industries, and that the interactions 
between actors as well as the use of different instruments 
have changed over time. Principally, governance has 
three dimensions.29 In the actor dimension, it concerns 
how different actors and interests are represented in the 
policy process. The crucial aspect is the relationship and 
29  Treib, O., H. Bähr, et al. (2005). Modes of Governance: 
a note towards conceptual clarification, EUROGOV 
Report.
balance between private and public actors in the policy 
making process. Some call it “new” governance when 
civil society has a stronger role, and “old” governance 
when the state controls activities in a coercive manner, 
but whether these are really old or new is a matter of 
debate – we would argue that they co-exist and have 
always co-existed. In the institutional dimension, it 
concerns how (according to what rules) different actors 
interact, for instance through hierarchical control, 
through market transactions, or through different types 
of networks. Finally in the policy dimension, governance 
concerns what range of instruments is used, including 
a) regulatory standards such as product standards, bans 
and regulations, b) market-oriented measures, such as 
market designs, deregulations, green taxing, and c) 
“soft” approaches including voluntary and informational 
processes, co-regulation and cooperative procedures 
such as private-public partnerships. Governance is 
thus a multifaceted concept, involving both the shifting 
rules and actors in the process of policy making, and the 
shifting policy contents. In this paper, we are interested 
primarily in the policy dimension of governance, but 
take considerable note of the changing roles of actors 
both in the development and implementation of these 
policies.
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In the following, the eco-efficient economy agenda is unpacked into three linked challenges: climate change, 
energy, and industrial competitiveness and innovation. 
These challenges set the scene for some of the issues 
that Europe is “up against” in advancing its strategies 
and measures for a European eco-efficient economy. 
This is in no way intended to be a comprehensive 
account of all sustainable development challenges in 
their ecological, social or economic dimensions, but it 
covers some central considerations.
thE ClImAtE ChAllEnGE
Among the wide range of serious environmental 
challenges currently faced by humankind, climate 
change is usually considered the most urgent, and in 
many ways the most challenging to address. It is urgent 
because of the devastating effects that climate change 
is likely to lead to in the long term. It is challenging 
because emissions of greenhouse gases appear to be 
built into our economic systems, occurring in many 
human activities and are strongly connected to economic 
growth. Within the EU, the majority of greenhouse gas 
emissions come from the energy and transport sectors, 
and the total share related to energy supply and use 
across sectors is about 80 per cent (Figure 3). 
The climate system is complex and the exact 
consequences of increasing global average temperature 
are therefore difficult to foresee. However, there is 
much research to indicate that climate change is likely 
to cause widespread damage to populations, ecosystem 
and resources. Climate change is intrinsically linked 
to other serious environmental and development 
challenges, such as water and food supply, public 
health, desertification, and ecosystems resilience, 
which need to be considered in developing mitigation 
and adaptation responses. It may cause severe damage 
to infrastructure, make large areas inhabitable, and 
lead to increases in diseases and in mortality. Lately, 
Nicholas Stern along with others have emphasised 
and increasingly recognised that the effects of climate 
change are likely to be so costly that measures seeking 
to avoid climate change will lead to economic gains 
2  a brieF look at the imPerative For a euroPean 
eCo-eFFiCient eConomy
when compared to the cost of addressing the effects of 
climate change once they have appeared.30 
In order to avoid alarming effects, EU leaders have stated 
that global average temperature should not increase by 
more than maximum 2˚C, compared to the temperature 
in pre-industrial time. This likely requires a stabilization 
of the level of atmospheric CO2 at 350 – 400 ppm and 
that global emissions start decrease within the next 10-15 
years (see Figure 4). However, at the beginning of 2009, 
the CO2 level was already 386 ppm (+2.1 ppm from last 
year).31 Furthermore, in the long run, emissions of CO2 
must not exceed the carbon uptake and decomposition 
of the CO2.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), now ratified by 192 countries, sets 
an overall framework for intergovernmental efforts to 
tackle the challenges posed by climate change. The 
convention aims to achieve a stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
“would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system”. It also states that this level 
should be achieved “within a time frame sufficient to 
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, 
to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner.” Linked to the UNFCCC is the Kyoto Protocol, 
which sets binding targets for 37 industrialised countries 
as well as for the European Union. Countries should 
reach their targets through national measures, but may 
also use three market-based mechanisms: emissions 
trading; clean development mechanisms, by which 
countries can implement emission reduction activities 
in developing countries; and joint implementation, by 
which a country can earn emission reduction units from 
another developed country with emission reduction 
30  Stern, N. (2006). The Stern Review on the Economics 
of Climate Change. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press.
31  Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide - Mauna Loa 
Oberavtory, http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/
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Figure 3: share of 2006 greenhouse gas emissions in the eu-27, by main activity  
(Source: EEA, 2008b)
commitments, by implementing a project in the latter 
country.32 
In December 2009, Denmark is hosting the 15th 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
COP15 is crucial for the international climate change 
negotiations. The parties to the UNFCCC agreed at 
COP13 in Bali in December 2007 that negotiations on 
a future agreement have to be concluded at COP15 in 
Copenhagen. The decision was made to the backdrop 
of the increased emphasis on the need for swift action 
32  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (1992). www.unfccc.int.
made in the latest report by the UN Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, as well as the recognition 
that 2009 will be one of the last chances for a agreement 
if it is to be approved and ratified prior to the expiry 
of the commitments set in the Kyoto Protocol in 2012. 
International agreements are important and must lead 
to concrete commitments. The EU aims to be a driving 
force in the development of international climate 
agreements and a further promotion of an expansion 
of the ETS internationally (or by linking equivalent 
systems), is needed.
The EU-27 countries account for approximately 10 per 
cent of global greenhouse gas emissions covered by the 
UNFCCC. According to the Kyoto Protocol, countries 
that were EU members in 1997 (EU-15) should reduce 
Figure 4: Co2 emissions and equilibrium temperature changes of different stabilisation levels 
(Source: Fourth IPCC report, 2008)
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their emissions by 8 per cent during 2008-2012 , 
compared to 1990 levels. By 2006, which is the latest 
verifiable data point, emissions had been reduced by 
2.7 per cent, a shortfall by 5.3 per cent.33 However, the 
target is expected to be met by a large margin given 
efforts in the ETS and Kyoto mechanisms (Figure 5).
The European Commission has launched more ambitious 
targets since the Kyoto Protocol, described for instance 
in the European Climate Change Programme (ECCP) 
1 and 2. In March 2007, the European Council decided 
on the strategic goal to limit the global temperature 
increase by 2˚C. The EU Member States are committed 
to achieve a reduction of at least 20 per cent of their 
greenhouse gas emissions until 2020 and are ready to 
reduce emissions by 30 per cent under a new global 
climate change agreement involving comparable efforts 
by others. The emissions of greenhouse gases in the EU 
are decreasing and are projected to continue to do so 
until 2020. However, in order to meet the emissions 
target of 20 per cent reduction, further emission 
reductions are needed. 
A large part of the eco-efficient economy agenda 
concerns the opportunity to decouple environmental 
pressure from economic development. However, 
emissions of CO2 have so far been much more difficult 
33  EEA (2008b). Greenhouse gas emissions trend and pro-
jections in Europe 2008. Copenhagen, European Envi-
ronment Agency.
to decouple from economic growth than, for example, 
local air pollution. One reason may be the diffused 
and differentiated locations of the environmental 
pressure and impact. Climate change is a problem on 
the global scale, caused by nearly all economic and 
human activity, and with impacts on people in all 
countries. Although the ability of a single government 
to address this problem is clearly very limited, certain 
decoupling of CO2 emissions from economic growth 
has nevertheless occurred in some EU countries34. 
However, efficiency improvements in many industrial 
sectors are counteracted by increasing consumption. In 
addition, an increasing proportion of products purchased 
in the EU are produced in other parts of the world. Thus, 
emissions related to the production of goods purchased 
in EU states exceed the emissions of the production 
within the countries. 
Nonetheless, there are convincing analyses which show 
that targeting the climate challenge does not need to lead 
to adverse economic effects. The investment needed to 
maintain the level of greenhouse gases at 450 ppm have 
been estimated to cost about 0.5 per cent of global GDP 
over the period 2013-2030, which would lead to a fall 
in global GDP growth by 0.19 per cent per year up to 
2030. This is only a fraction of the expected annual GDP 
growth rate.35 Furthermore, when taking into account 
future damages on social and economic systems from 
climate change impacts, it has been shown that these 
may far exceed the mitigation costs (although this all 
depends on the discount rate used in the calculus).  The 
“Stern Report” provided a ball park estimate: a business-
as-usual scenario may entail losses in the magnitude of 
ca 15 per cent of global consumption.36 
Moreover, tackling climate change could lead to positive 
effects on employment, with new job opportunities 
being created in the new fields of eco-innovation. In 
a consultancy report to the European Commission, 
the turnover of eco-industries is estimated to €270 
34  Nordic Council of Ministers (2006). Decoupling of CO
2
 
Emissions from Energy Intensive Industries. Copenhagen, 
Nordic Council of Ministers.
35  CEC (2007d). Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 
degrees Celsius - The way ahead for 2020 and beyond 
[COM(2007) 2 final]. Brussels, European Commission.
36  Stern, N. (2006). The Stern Review on the Economics 
of Climate Change. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press.
Figure 5: eu-15 Greenhouse gas emissions 
and projections 1990-2012     (Source: EEA, 2009)
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billion, equalling ca 1.4 per cent of total EU GDP, 
and employing directly 2.3 million people.37 Including 
indirect and induced effects (such as induced demand for 
component parts) this has been estimated to equal ca 4.6 
million jobs. A recent UK industrial analysis estimates 
the global market for “low-carbon and environmental 
goods and services at over €3,000 billion (of which 
roughly €1,000 billion in renewable energy), and with 
37  GHK (2007). Links between the environment, economy 
and jobs. London.
table 1: Global market value for low-carbon 
and environmental goods and services in 
billion €            (Source: Innovas, 2009)
Air Pollution              31.77 
Environmental Consultancy     26.54 
Environmental Monitoring                4.90 
Marine Pollution Control                3.95 
Noise & Vibration Control                7.16 
Contaminated Land  30.44 
Waste Management  158.96 
Water and Waste Water Treatment  267.19 
Recovery and Recycling  210.82 
Hydro              14.43 
Wave & Tidal     2.25 
Biomass  157.84 
Wind  395.72 
Geothermal  311.16 
Renewable Consulting      16.91 
Photovoltaic  160.09 
Alternative Fuels for Vehicles  383.31 
Alternative Fuels  635.85 
Additional Energy Sources       40.59 
Carbon Capture & Storage      14.99 
Carbon Finance       36.08 
Energy Management        82.30 
Building Technologies  439.68 
totAl All SuB-SECtoRS         3,432.94 
Figure 6: eu-27 energy import dependency in 
2005 and projected for 2020 with oil prices at 
61 and 100 $/barrel (in mtoe) (Source: CEC, 2008f)
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significant growth sustained over the economic crisis 
(Table 1).38 
thE EnERGy ChAllEnGE
The energy sector is a crucial sector for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. The use of energy is built 
into almost all parts of our society, including industrial 
production and the way we live our daily lives. For 
the energy sector, apart from the targets for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, a number of other crucial 
challenges can be mentioned. These include the 
challenge of securing the supply of energy in the risk of 
a new oil crisis, and addressing dependence on imported 
energy. The external energy dependency of the EU is 
constantly increasing. Between 1996 and 2006, EU-27 
energy dependency increased by about 22 per cent, with 
imports going up from 44 per cent to 54 per cent of total 
consumption.39 This is projected to continue into the 
future (Figure 6). In the 2008 Strategic Energy Review, 
it is noted that energy prices have risen by an average 
of 15 per cent in the European Union in the last year, 
and that 54 per cent of Europe’s energy is imported 
at a cost of €350 billion.40 The review notes that “The 
medium-term trends for global oil and gas consumption 
foresee a continued, significant and sustained increase 
38  Innovas (2009). Low Carbon and Environmental Goods 
and Services:  an industry analysis  London, BERR.
39  EUROSTAT (2009). Energy, Transport and Environment 
Indicators. Luxemburg, EUROSTAT.
40  CEC (2008f). Second Strategic Energy Review - an EU 
energy security and solidarity action plan COM(2008) 
781 Brussels, European Commission.
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in demand, particularly from developing countries. At 
the same time, remaining reserves and spare production 
capacity are becoming increasingly concentrated in a 
few hands. Recent severe price rises and volatility on 
oil and gas markets reflect these trends.”
This energy dependency is considered to imply large 
economic, political as well as environmental risks for 
the European Union. The security of supply issue – and 
within this, the EU’s relationship with Russia and the 
oil states – has gained increasing attention over the last 
few years. Here, the enlargement to 27 Member States 
has widened the diversity in the European Union, 
and poses new challenges on the decision-making 
apparatus. For instance, fossil-based energy in Eastern 
Europe may have Russian gas as its most obvious 
lower-carbon alternative. Some observers consider this 
an unattractive option – for political, economic and 
environmental reasons. 
For the energy sector, two major areas are particularly 
critical to the eco-efficient economy. First, improving 
energy efficiency will be decisive for reducing costs 
and enhancing competitiveness, for improving security 
of supply and for meeting the commitments on climate 
change made under the Kyoto Protocol. A broader 
perspective on energy efficiency, than only looking at 
the end-use of energy, striving for increased efficiency 
at all levels and stages, is preferable. Thus it delivers 
dividends on all energy policy “pillars”. Second, 
the sources of energy need to be switched to more 
sustainable, renewable forms of energy. This not only 
requires the development of new technologies, but also 
the creation of new markets for them, and capturing of 
related business opportunities. These two fields are both 
cornerstones in the European energy strategy, and they 
will be examined more closely in two case studies in the 
next chapter. It should be noted that responding to the 
energy challenge carries with it major opportunities for 
European industries. For instance, a recent industrial 
analysis on low-carbon technologies shows that the 
global market for renewable energy is above €1,000 
billion (and growing rapidly), with in particular wind 
energy industry showing fast growth, in particular on 
the manufacturing and supply of components for large 
and small wind turbines and in the power integration 
systems, distribution and maintenance services.41 
41  Innovas (2009). Low Carbon and Environmental Goods 
and Services:  an industry analysis  London, BERR.
Figure 7: Primary energy production 1996 & 
2006, breakdown by fuel source   
(Source: Eurostat, 2009)
Figure 7 shows the ongoing transition from fossil fuels to 
renewable sources of energy in Europe’s own production 
mix. Oil and hard coal production has gone down by 30 
and 44 per cent respectively, whereas renewable energy 
has increased by 44 per cent from 1996 to 2006.
There is considerable room for improvements in energy 
efficiency in many areas of the economy. The European 
Commission has estimated that the EU is “wasting” 
at least 20 per cent of its total energy use, which up 
to 2020 may cost the Union €100 billion in financial 
terms, precluding the environmental costs involved.42 
Nonetheless, improvements in energy efficiency have 
been notable over the last decades. The Commission 
estimates that as compared to the 1970’s, energy 
intensity has decreased by 40 per cent in Germany 
and Denmark, and by 30 per cent in France. Overall 
energy intensity has continued to decrease in recent 
years – the fall from 1996 to 2006 was from 240 to 202 
kgoe/1000 euro (Figure 9)43. Figure 8 shows the energy 
savings calculated on the basis of 1971 energy intensity, 
measured in “negajoules”.
42  CEC (2006f). Saving 20% by 2020 - action plan for 
energy efficiency: realising the potential. Brussels, Euro-
pean Commission.
43  EUROSTAT (2009). Energy, Transport and Environment 
Indicators. Luxemburg, EUROSTAT.
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The European Council decided in March 2007 to 
reduce energy consumption by 20 per cent by 2020.44 
The transport sector is one of the sectors where there 
is room for significant savings. For the transport sector, 
energy savings are suggested to be achieved through 
tax schemes favoring clean and efficient vehicles, 
rewards to manufacturers supporting energy efficiency, 
by encouraging good tire pressure, use of public 
transportation and car pools, and improved road and air 
traffic management. Another significant area is energy 
production; between 40 and 60 per cent of the energy 
used for electricity production is lost in the production 
process, although the energy exchange varies highly 
between technologies. The Green Paper also points to 
energy savings in the buildings sector, which accounts 
for about 40 per cent of the energy used in the EU (see 
Chapter 3). In the buildings sector, significant savings 
can be made by actions such as retrofitting, changing 
to energy-efficient lighting and using better performing 
appliances, as well as more efficient materials 
technologies. For the industrial sector, although a lot 
has been achieved, further investments in more efficient 
technology are still often profitable. 
Savings in energy use must be related to a wider systems 
approach in how resources are allocated and used. A 
narrow sector approach may well lead to suboptimal 
systems solutions when taking a wider view, and also 
may lead to spill over effects, such as when biofuels for 
44  CEC (2005). Energy Efficiency – or Doing More With 
Less COM(2005) 265 final. Brussels, European Commis-
sion.
Figure 8: development of primary energy 
demand and “negajoules” in eu-25   
(Source: CEC, 2006b)
Figure 9: energy intensity in the eu 27 from 
1996-2006           (Source: Eurostat, 2009)
transportation lead to marginal improvements or even 
increases in greenhouse gas emissions when looking 
at the wider life-cycle and indirect impacts, such as 
greenhouse gas releases due to land clearing for biofuels 
cultivation.
thE ComPEtItIvEnESS AnD InnovAtIon 
ChAllEnGE
The increasingly global economic integration offers 
many opportunities for European industries. Today, the 
EU is the world’s biggest exporter of goods and services, 
and international trade provides over 15 per cent of the 
region’s GDP. The European Commission attributes a 
significant proportion (at least 20 per cent) of the last 
50 years’ wealth increases in the EU to globalization.45 
Therefore, the EU has been an ardent supporter of 
liberalisation and economic integration world-wide. At 
the same time, many European politicians, citizens and 
companies are concerned with job losses and downward 
salary pressures as a result of global competition. The 
rapid growth of economies like China and India on the 
global scene has fed into and reinforced these concerns, 
not least in view of the uneven commitments made 
concerning climate change mitigation between the EU 
and other states.
Concerns about competitiveness and the health of 
Europe’s industrial economy have of course been 
45  Denis, C., K. McMorrow, et al. (2006). Globalisation : 
trends, issues and macro implications for the EU. Brus-
sels, European Commission.
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exacerbated as the economic and financial crisis 
continues to unroll. The unemployment rate in January 
2009 was 8.2 per cent in the EU, up from 6.8 per cent 
one year earlier.46 Similarly, GDP is now experiencing 
negative growth, with a 1.5 per cent contraction in 
the 4th quarter of 2008. In December 2008, industrial 
production fell by 12 per cent on a year-on-year basis. 
Many analysts and politicians see an enhanced role for 
states in cushioning the impact of the crisis, but also 
to take the opportunity to make the right economic 
reforms now, using the crisis as window of opportunity 
to ensure a more dynamic policy framework that allows 
Europe to take advantage of the opportunities offered 
by globalisation. This is of course easier said that done. 
We have a depressed world economy, with advanced 
economies experiencing the worst slump since the 
1930’s.47 Interest rates and monetary policy offer little 
potential for help since rates are already close to zero. 
Over the longer term, Europe has indeed faired 
relatively well in globalisation. True, there has been a 
major redistribution of market share between different 
countries since the mid 1990’s, with developing 
countries reinforcing their position as exporters.48 But 
compared to the US and Japan, the market share loss 
of the EU has been relatively small. While the US and 
Japan have lost market shares of 4.1 and 4.4 percentage 
points respectively, the loss of the EU market share has 
46  DG EC FIN, March 2009 indicators
47  IMF (2009). Economic outlook update January 2009. 
Washington DC, International Monetary Fund.
48  CEC (2008d). Global Europe. EU performance in the 
global economy. Brussels, European Commission.
been only 1.3 percentage points. The comparatively 
stronger performance of the EU can be explained by the 
upgrading of EU products: half of EU exports consist 
of “upmarket” products, or products sold at a premium 
price because of quality, branding and related services. 
In addition, a slightly better export performance of the 
new EU Member States compared to the old ones has 
been noted. Furthermore, the EU is the largest global 
player in international trade in services, and EU exports 
of services have grown faster than the world average 
during the last years. 
The performance of EU exports varies between different 
geographical regions. Exports from the EU are strong 
in countries with a static demand, but not as strong in 
rapidly growing markets – particularly Asia.49 The loss 
of market share in these dynamic importing markets is 
worrying. Improving this situation can be seen as a key 
challenge for the competitiveness of the EU. Another 
challenge lies in the field of high-tech products. The 
EU holds 18.5 per cent of the world market for high-
tech products and is thus the principal exporter of 
this product category. Considering the EU’s overall 
economic development level, one would expect that 
the EU market share in the field of high-tech products 
would exceed that of the overall exports. However, 
this is not the case, with the market share for high-tech 
products being slightly lower than the EU’s overall 
market share for merchandise products, 19.5 per cent. 
The loss of the EU market share for high-tech products 
49  CEPII-CIREM (2004). European industry’s place in the 
International Division of Labour: situation and prospects 
- a report for DG Trade. Paris, CEPII.
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is also larger than the overall market share loss – 2.4 
percentage points compared to 1.3. The challenge for 
the EU in the field of high-tech products is therefore 
how to keep these products at the cutting edge of quality 
and innovation. 
One source of vulnerability is the reliance on imports 
for components to production processes. Two thirds 
of the imports from outside of the EU to EU25 are 
incorporated as inputs in the production processes50. 
Russia, China, India, and other parts of Asia and South 
America play increasingly important roles in shaping 
both the demand and supply of raw materials. The past 
couple of years have witnessed an increasing strain 
on the availability of materials, while the outtake 
of resources often exceeds the planet’s carrying 
capacity. Suggestions for a European resource policy, 
incorporating natural resources, secondary materials 
and waste have emerged on the agenda.51 The eco-
efficient economy as an integral part of a European 
resource policy can play a significant role in alleviating 
this combined economic and environmental strain. 
The dependency on component imports could become 
a transfer mechanism for eco-efficient solutions. If 
European industries through eco-efficient innovation 
can remain at the cutting edge while relying on imports 
of components from elsewhere, it can both create and 
exploit global market demands for environmental 
management and low-carbon solutions. 
The debate about competitiveness and climate policy has 
in recent years centred on the impacts of the emissions 
trading system on European industries’ competitiveness. 
This is an issue that has been of increasing concern as 
ETS II is being prepared with tighter allocation plans 
than in the first round. Based on the PACE model, 
DG Enterprise finds that the overall competitiveness 
impacts of strengthening the ETS have been moderate 
50  CEC (2008d). Global Europe. EU performance in the 
global economy. Brussels, European Commission.
51  CEC (2006c). Fourth report of the high level group on 
Competitiveness, Energy and the Environment: Ensur-
ing future sustainability and competitiveness of European 
enterprises in a carbon and resource constrained world. 
Brussels, European Commission.
during the first round.52 Still, risks of market losses 
and carbon leakage are a reality in some greenhouse-
gas intensive sectors.53 Such risks are influenced not 
only by European-level policy such as the ETS, but 
also by national level governance measures such as 
efficiency programmes, energy taxes and environmental 
regulations. To cope with the competitiveness concerns 
analysts have pointed to a) the application of sectoral 
approach in allocation of commitments; b) continued 
grandfathering of emissions permits, and c) massive 
investments in technology innovation and large-scale 
application. 
Governance and regulations for the eco-efficient 
economy may also pose another challenge for Europe’s 
competitiveness long term, namely that of regulatory 
burden, an issue of considerable concern for SMEs in 
Europe and frequently ranked as their most important 
problem in surveys. Governance for eco-efficient 
economy can be complicated and administratively 
difficult, as legislation and regulation such as ETS, 
permitting procedures and reporting requirements are 
often designed with large corporations in mind. Since 
SME’s are widely considered to be crucial part of 
today’s economy (representing 67 per cent of all private-
sector jobs) as well as the future eco-efficient economy, 
efforts for “better regulation” need to be vigorously 
pursued, so that the net administrative burden may 
decrease even if instruments used are forceful. Here the 
European “Think Small First” principle and its 2007 
action programme to reduce adminstrative burden are 
important development in the right direction.54
The governance challenge for EU leaders is to turn 
the potential benefits of global competition into real 
gains while minimising the social costs that arise from 
structural change. This is a multifaceted challenge. 
The way forward is often seen to be move towards a 
knowledge-based economy, whereby the intensified 
knowledge input, as opposed to raw materials or labour, 
52  Worbst, P. (2007). Competitiveness Effects of Trading 
Emissions and Fostering Technologies to Meet the EU 
Kyoto Targets: A Quantitative Economic Assessment. 
Brussels, European Commission.
53  Danish Ministry of Finance (2008). Økonomisk Tema: 
Vækst, klima og konkurrenceevne. Copenhagen, Govern-
ment of Denmark.
54  CEC (2008h). Putting Small Businesses First. Brussels, 
European Commission
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is the key input in production. The transition to the 
knowledge economy, at the forefront for example of 
the Lisbon strategy, is closely connected to the political 
interest in innovation and how to promote it. European 
decision makers now regularly argue along the lines 
that “Europe cannot compete unless it becomes more 
inventive”.55 It has been argued that the EU’s strength 
in R&D has not yet been complemented with adequate 
governance for innovation, and that the EU has been 
relatively less successful than its competitors – notably 
US and Japan – in converting its science to commercially 
valuable activities. For instance, Europe is lagging 
behind in venture capital to help new technologies 
through the “valley of death” from demonstration 
to commercialisation. For instance, the Cleantech 
Group reported that in 2008 North American venture 
capital for cleantech totalled $5.8 billion whereas the 
corresponding number for Europe was $1.8 billion56. 
This trend appears to be turning course however, with 
Europe’s volume going up from $680 million in 2006. 
This is confirmed by the latest European Innovation 
55  CEC (2008e). Putting knowledge into practice: A broad-
based innovation strategy for the EU. Brussels, European 
Commission.
56  http://cleantech.com/about/pressreleases/010609.cfm 
Figure 12: eu-27 country groups’ innovation 
performance per dimension    (Source: CEC, 2009a)
Scoreboard which shows that in recent years the gaps 
have been closing (see Figure 11).57 . 
The Scoreboard uses a composite index of innovation 
comprising 26 different indicators and traces innovation 
performance across the 27 Member States. Figure 12 
shows the six key dimensions and how the four different 
groups of EU Member States, from leaders to laggards, 
perform on each of these.
Innovation systems can be seen as networks to 
efficiently distribute knowledge and information. 
Policies relating to science and technology, industry 
and education will need to place new emphasis on the 
role and importance of innovation systems, as well 
as the requirement for infrastructures, and incentives 
which encourage investments in research and training 
to support those systems. Clusters are of increasing 
interest as they have been shown to have a significant 
role in enhancing competitiveness and innovation.58 In 
the broadest sense, clusters can be defined as regional 
concentrations of specialised companies and institutions 
connected through multiple linkages. Figure 13 shows 
the role of clusters in promoting innovation, using the 
57  CEC (2009a). 2008 European Innovation Scoreboard. 
Brussels, European Commission.
58  CEC (2008c). The concept of clusters and cluster poli-
cies and their role for competitiveness and innovation: 
Main statistical results and lessons learned COM(2008) 
652. Brussels, European Commission.
Figure 11: Closing the eu innovation gap with 
us and Japan            (Source: CEC, 2009a)
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Figure 13: Patenting as a function of regions’ 
cluster strength59                     (Source: CEC, 2008c)
level of patenting in a region as measure of innovation 
performance.
One benefit of the innovation perspective on 
competitiveness is its consideration of not only supply-
side factors for industrial renewal, but also demand-side 
factors. Ultimately, the value and competitiveness will be 
determined by market conditions, and the development 
of long term competitiveness will rely on Europe’s 
ability to innovate and adapt to changing market 
conditions. It is true that Europe has lagged behind in 
important new areas such as for instance biotechnology. 
The European Lead Market Initiative takes a positive 
step toward advancing demand-side measures such as 
regulation, procurement and standardisation to bring 
down barriers for innovative goods and services in six 
high-growth market areas. These include bio-based 
products, recycling, sustainable construction, ehealth, 
protective textiles, and renewable energy.605960 
59 Cluster strength is a composite index of size, speciali-
zation and focus developed by the European Cluster 
Observatory, see www.clusterobservatory.eu/index.
php?id=49&nid= 
60  CEC (2007b). A Lead Market for Europe Com 2007 860. 
Brussels, European Commission.
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this chapter presents eight examples of sectors and activities that are central to the eco-efficient 
economy. The examples demonstrate challenges and 
opportunities, along with past and present efforts made 
in different sectors to address different aspects of an 
eco-efficient economy. Examples can be drawn from 
virtually every part of society, and we have here chosen 
to focus on a limited selection, from different industrial 
sectors and domains at different stages of maturity: 
some are at an emerging or early-market level, whereas 
others are more mature. Whether directly or indirectly 
each example addresses energy use and climate change 
as central aspects of the eco-efficient economy.
The examples are presented in a particular order. The 
first ones are clearly the “obvious options” for eco-
efficiency – that is, the ones where great gains are made 
at little or no extra cost, whereas the final ones represent 
what many consider to be the more challenging ones 
when it comes to advancing the European leadership. 
Importantly, not all examples are success stories, and 
some of them point to dilemmas and challenges that 
need to be taken into consideration in order to advance 
the eco-efficient economy agenda. Still, the overall 
picture is one of potential and opportunity, and how 
efforts, whether on behalf of governments or private 
actors, have led to achievements in the past.
We acknowledge that many more examples could 
have been presented. For instance, on the “heavy 
industry” side, sectors such as industrial minerals, 
cement and basic metals industries (other than steel) 
entail processes that are important to address in the 
eco-efficient economy. On the “clean-tech” side, new 
technologies, applications and businesses are emerging 
in for instance biomaterials, waste management and 
water. Our selection is limited by the resources of the 
study.
EnERGy EFFICIEnCy –thE ESSEnCE oF thE 
ECo-EFFICIEnt EConomy
Improving energy efficiency is a strategy that resonates 
with all aspects of the eco-efficient economy agenda: 
reducing energy demand and costs, creating jobs, and 
avoiding CO2 emissions. Numerous studies have shown 
the importance of energy efficiency for reaching climate 
policy targets. For example, energy efficiency accounts 
for more than half of the reductions in energy related 
CO2 emissions by 2030 in one of the World Energy 
Outlook stabilisation scenarios61. 
Energy efficiency efforts have a long history in Europe, 
notably on the national level, initially prompted by the 
oil crises and more recently motivated by climate policy. 
Building codes and renovation programs has delivered 
large energy savings throughout most of Europe since 
the 1970’s. During the period of low energy prices of 
the late 1980’s and 1990’s energy efficiency was not a 
political priority. The overriding paradigm in this era 
of market liberalism was that governments should not 
intervene unless there were market failures to correct, 
for example, external costs and lack of information, and 
energy efficiency was seen to be handled by the market. 
But energy efficiency has made a strong come-back in 
energy policy in recent years. The Directive 2006/32/
EC on Energy End-use Efficiency and Energy Services 
(ESD) came into effect in May, 2006 and is one of 
several EU policies targeting energy use.62 It aims at 
enhancing the cost-effective improvement of energy 
end-use efficiency in the Member States. The ESD has 
set an overall indicative target of 9 per cent for energy 
savings to be realised in EU Member States in the period 
of 2008-2016. The ESD is one of several EU initiatives 
to improve energy efficiency, but additional efforts 
will be needed to reach 20 per cent savings by 2020 as 
announced by the European Council in spring 2007. (see 
further Chapter 4) The idea that governments have an 
important role in supporting energy efficiency through 
regulation, economic incentives, and procurement 
policies, is now getting increased support – and goes 
beyond correcting for market failures.
61  IEA (2009). World Energy Outlook. Paris, International 
Energy Agency.
62  CEC (2006b). Directive 2006/32/EC of 5 April 2006 on 
energy end-use efficiency and energy services. Brussels, 
European Commission.
3  eCo-eFFiCient eConomy ChallenGes in PraCtiCe – seCtor 
exPerienCes
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Promoting energy efficiency beyond the use of energy 
taxes presents many challenges. There are numerous 
barriers to the implementation of energy efficiency: 
actions that are obviously cost effective to consumers or 
society as a whole are not being taken. One illustration 
of this is the principal-agent problem – that is, that the 
investment in energy-using equipment (e.g. a low-
efficiency refrigerator) is made by someone else (e.g. 
the landlord) than the user (e.g. the tenant) who pays the 
energy bill. Energy is used in a plethora of applications 
throughout different sectors in society, ranging from 
stand-by electricity use in DVD-players to the use of 
coke in steel making. For each energy end-use there may 
be different technical, economic, and organisational 
conditions that determine the barriers and potentials 
for energy savings, and thus the conditions for energy 
efficiency governance. Furthermore, the effects of 
energy efficiency policy are hard to pin down due to 
phenomena like free-riders, spill-overs and rebound 
effects. There are so many factors influencing an 
investment decision – for example, to install a variable 
speed drive in industry – that not even the actual 
decision maker can be sure about the influence of a 
specific policy instrument. Energy efficiency policy 
will always struggle with complexity, such as the issue 
of additionality; that is to what extent users would 
undertake efforts in the absence of support, but this does 
not make energy efficiency policy less vital for reaching 
important energy and climate policy goals.
The complexity and diversity of energy end-users 
makes it difficult to devise simple energy efficiency 
policy solutions. While energy taxes and consumer 
information may provide incentives for better informed 
decisions about investments in buildings and equipment, 
many barriers to implementation remain. Policies must 
often be designed or adapted to specific sectors and 
technologies, taking into account incentive structures 
and relations between various agents. In addition there 
are considerable differences between Member States 
in terms of market, organisational and administrative 
structures. Thus, while common EU policies are 
important in some areas – the fuel economy of new cars, 
for instance – it is necessary to stimulate and support 
Member States in stepping up their efforts for specific 
policy design and implementation at the national level.
Denmark is one of the countries that have maintained 
ambitious energy end-use efficiency policies and 
programmes since 1973. Final energy use is lower today 
than in 1972, despite considerable economic growth, 
which means there has been absolute decoupling (see 
Chapter 1). Denmark also has targets to reduce energy 
demand, in absolute terms, by 4 per cent between 2006 
and 2020.  An evaluation in 2008 of all energy efficiency 
programmes shows that programmes have delivered 
cost-effective energy savings with but one exception.63 
The evaluation also makes recommendations on how 
to adapt and intensify efforts in light of new conditions 
and priorities. This includes the establishment of a ten 
year (2010-2020) energy efficiency program operated 
by a new organisation with an independent board, a 
clear mandate and own funding.
The greatest challenge to advancing energy efficiency 
is how to govern development in order to accelerate 
energy efficiency above autonomous rates of 
improvement. A promising example is offered by 
voluntary agreements, where several countries have 
been successful in reducing industrial energy demand. 
In the Swedish Programme For Industrial Energy 
Efficiency (PFE), eligible industries are exempt from 
electricity taxes in exchange for committing to carry out 
audits, implementing an energy management system 
and investing in profitable measures.64 The PFE will 
result in 2 to 5 percent electricity savings (depending 
on assumptions concerning multiplier effects and free-
riders), with additional savings in fuel use. It exemplifies 
how government and industry can successfully work 
together toward further eco-efficiency at the enterprise 
as well as economy-wide level. Beyond Sweden, many 
countries are now intensifying their efforts to promote 
energy efficiency in the best possible way in different 
energy end-uses and across sectors.
Higher energy prices and raised environmental awareness 
are strong drivers for the energy efficiency market. 
Energy efficiency is a product characteristic rather than 
a product in itself which makes it difficult to distinguish 
market and job growth in this area. Nonetheless, 
energy efficiency provides market opportunities for 
63  Togeby, M., Ed. (2008). En vej till flere og billigere ener-
gibesparelser (A road to more and less expensive energy 
savings), Energianalyse Report for the Danish Energy 
Agency.
64  Stenqvist, C. and L. J. Nilsson (2009). Process and 
impact evaluation of PFE - a Swedish tax rebate pro-
gramme for industrial energy efficiency, ECEEE 2009 
Summer Study, European Council for an Energy Efficient 
Economy.
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suppliers of building materials, windows, lighting, and 
ventilation equipment, and creates a variety of jobs in 
the construction industry. It is in the market for energy 
efficiency services that energy efficiency becomes 
a product in itself, delivered by Energy Service 
Companies (ESCO). This is a rapidly growing business, 
facilitated by the development and cost reduction of 
ICT. Some of the major players are originally building 
controls and automation manufacturers such as TAC 
by Schneider Electric, Siemens, ABB, and Honeywell, 
but also power companies. However, also SMEs are 
taking important shares of this new market, which 
requires niche knowledge and business organizations 
that do not always fit neatly into the structure of major 
corporations. Rough estimates put the European ESCO 
market potential on the order of €5-25 billion per year 
– a substantial opportunity for eco-efficient economic 
growth.65 The market is growing rapidly in both Europe 
and North America.66 For example, in January 2009, 
the U.S. Department of Energy awarded a contract to 
TAC by Schneider Electric for up to 5 billion USD in 
energy efficiency projects at federally owned buildings 
and facilities.
DIStRICt hEAtInG – moDES oF ExPAnSIon 
AnD FuEl ShIFtInG
Heating and cooling account for about 50 per cent of 
final energy use in Europe. At the same time, EU energy 
use is associated with huge heat losses – Euroheat & 
Power estimates the annual heat losses to be about 5500 
TWh, i.e. roughly one third of annual primary energy 
use, and that part of these losses can be recovered in the 
district heating systems (DH systems).67 The major part 
of the heat losses occur in thermal power plants. If half 
of the heat wasted were to be used for district heating 
purposes, it could replace an approximately equal 
amount of natural gas, the main energy source used 
65  Boza-Kiss, B., P. Bertoldi, et al. (2007). Latest devel-
opment of energy service companies across Europe - A 
European ESCO update. Brussels, European Commission 
- Joint Research Centre (JRC)..
66  Lindgren, K. and L. J. Nilsson (2009). Transforming 
the Efficiency Gap into a Viable Business Opportunity: 
Lessons Learned from the ESCO Experience in Sweden, 
ECEEE Summer Study, 1-6 June 2009. Paris, Council for 
an Energy Efficient Economy.
67  Euroheat & Power (2005). The European Heat Market. 
Ecoheatcool project. Brussels, Euroheat & Power.
in individual heating in Europe. Assuming natural gas 
substitution and a natural gas price of €18-36 per MWh 
(€5-10 per GJ), annual fuel cost savings amounting to 
€50-100 billion could be achieved. Addressing heating 
and cooling interlinks with the energy efficiency 
agenda outlined above, and is central to an eco-efficient 
European economy. Yet, the heating and cooling sectors 
have to date received relatively little attention in national 
energy policy in most countries, and renewable energy 
sources (RES) account for less than 10 per cent of the 
energy used for heating and cooling purposes in the EU 
on average.68 DH systems provide an opportunity to 
increase the use of RES and improve energy efficiency 
by recovering heat that would otherwise be wasted. DH 
systems are found in many European countries though 
with great variance in popularity. These systems are 
common in Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the Baltic 
and Eastern European countries. 
This case focuses on the Swedish experience in 
advancing district heating as an eco-efficient solution. 
The DH systems in Sweden have played an important 
role in reducing the use of fossil fuels and expanding 
the use of RES – mainly biomass. These systems have 
also contributed to more efficient use of primary energy 
resources by enabling combined heat and power (CHP) 
production and recovery of industrial waste heat. The 
opportunity for energy efficient solutions has been a key 
driver for building DH systems in Sweden. Achieving 
air quality improvements has been another driver for 
such investments. The rationale for this is that it is 
easier and cheaper to control a few emission points than 
thousands. Positive effects on urban air quality were 
particularly noticeable in the 1960’s and 70’s. In 2007, 
DH accounted for 50 per cent of the delivered energy 
for heating of buildings in the residential and service 
sector. Total DH production in 2007 amounted to 56.3 
TWh (47.5 TWh was delivered) and was dominated 
by biomass, which accounted for 44 per cent of the 
production. The remaining energy supply consisted of 
municipal solid waste (MSW) (18 per cent), industrial 
waste heat (10 per cent), fossil fuels (13 per cent), peat 
(5 per cent) and heat from heat pumps (10 per cent) 
(Figure 14). The industrial waste heat is mainly supplied 
by forest industries (the dominant process industry 
68  CEC (2007e). Renewable Energy Road Map - Renewa-
ble energies in the 21st century: building a more sustain-
able future. COM(2006) 847 final. Brussels, European 
Commission.
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in Sweden), but a number of refineries, steelworks, 
chemical and food-processing industries, and one 
sugar mill also supply industrial waste heat to the DH 
systems.
Having proved able to quickly respond to government 
policies, the Swedish DH sector has twice played an 
important role in achieving national policy objectives 
relating to an eco-efficient economy. In association with 
the oil crises in the 1970’s, the DH systems proved to be 
ideal for reducing oil consumption – the main objective 
of energy policy at that time. Until the late 1970’s, there 
was a near-complete reliance on oil in DH production. 
However, prompted by high taxes on oil products 
that were introduced in the 1970’s, there was a major 
shift from oil to a variety of fuels and energy sources, 
including coal, MSW, heat pumps, and industrial 
waste heat. A second major fuel shift was initiated in 
the early 1990’s in response to the energy tax reform 
of 1991. This reform strengthened the environmental 
profile of the energy taxation system by increasing 
the taxation of fossil fuels in heat production, mainly 
by the introduction of a carbon tax. Apart from the 
biomass expansion, there has been a great increase in 
MSW incineration in recent years. This development is 
driven primarily by bans on landfilling combustible and 
organic waste. Hence, the DH sector has shown great 
fuel flexibility, which for example has been manifested 
in the accommodation of large volumes of unrefined 
biomass and MSW, fuels that are inconvenient or 
inappropriate (since they require emission control) to 
use in individual heating.
For countries with great reliance on thermal power 
production, the opportunity to produce electricity 
efficiently in CHP plants is probably the most compelling 
argument for building DH systems. Primary energy 
Figure 14: energy supply for district heating 
savings could also be achieved by utilising industrial 
waste heat, which is available in all countries that host 
process industries. Another argument for building DH 
systems is that they provide an opportunity to use deep 
geothermal heat. Unlike Sweden, many other European 
countries have favourable geophysical conditions for 
deep geothermal heat. The DH systems also enable 
the use of unrefined biomass and waste, fuels that are 
unsuitable in individual heating. Several European 
countries have untapped biomass potentials consisting 
of agricultural and forestry residues and MSW, and is the 
opportunity to grow energy crops on agricultural land. 
Poland is a case in point, and it also accommodates many 
and large DH systems.69 About 52 per cent of the Polish 
households are connected to a DH system. The major 
part of the total DH supply is produced in CHP plants, 
but there is still potential for increased integration with 
thermal power production, whereby achieving primary 
energy savings. Such energy efficiency improvements 
would reduce the use of coal, the dominating fuel in 
heat and electricity production in Poland. The coal 
consumption may also be reduced through biomass-
for-coal substitution. An attractive initial strategy is to 
co-fire biomass and coal – something that certain plants 
already do. DH production in the other Eastern European 
or Baltic countries is also heavily reliant on fossil fuels. 
However, similar to Sweden in the 1970s and 80s, the 
DH sectors in these countries could play an important 
role in reducing the use of fossil fuels while achieving 
environmental objectives such as emission reductions 
in carbon dioxide and possibly other pollutants, and 
reduced landfilling of waste. Fossil fuel substitution 
in these systems could also enhance security of supply 
depending on the type of fossil fuel replaced. Although 
the DH systems are a great asset to Poland and the other 
Eastern European or Baltic countries, many of these 
systems suffer large heat losses and are in acute need 
of refurbishment. Addressing the performance of these 
systems will be central to advancing DH as an eco-
efficient solution in these countries.
District cooling systems can, just like the DH systems, 
provide large energy savings. A district cooling system 
can reach an efficiency rate typically five or even 10 
times higher than traditional local electricity-driven 
equipment. Switching away from the electricity-driven 
equipment would also cut peak electricity demand in 
69  Ericsson, K. (2007). “Co-firing - A strategy for bioenergy 
in Poland?” Energy 32(10): 1838-1847.
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the summer. District cooling systems are found in a 
number of European cities, but the systems are quite 
small, mainly covering business districts. In total, 
district cooling accounts for about 1-2 per cent of the 
total cooling market in Europe.70 District cooling is 
often co-produced with district heat, and hence provide 
an additional business opportunity for energy service 
companies. Apart from potential energy savings and 
environmental benefits, the access to these systems 
may increase the attraction of a city or city district 
for investors. This was one of the arguments for the 
City Council of Barcelona to carefully plan for district 
heating and cooling in the new business district of 
Forum. The district heating and cooling in Barcelona 
is mainly produced from waste incineration. Since 
cooling demands are expected to continue growing 
in the future addressing cooling will, just as heating, 
be central to achieving an eco-efficient European 
economy.
BIoFuElS – ComPlEx RESouRCES In A 
GloBAl ContExt
Transport accounted for 31 per cent of final energy use 
in 2005 and is almost entirely dependent on gasoline and 
diesel from imported oil. It accounts for an increasing 
share of EU greenhouse gas emissions. Had the 
transport sector emissions followed the same reduction 
trend as society as a whole, total EU-27 greenhouse 
gas emissions during 1990–2005 would have fallen 
by 14 per cent instead of 7.9 per cent.71 Options for 
reducing transport sector emissions include efforts to 
moderate growth in transport, modal shifts, increased 
fuel efficiency, and switching to low-carbon biofuels 
and electricity. Although the other options may be 
more important, the need for low-carbon liquid fuels 
in transport will remain. Current biofuels production 
is dominated by ethanol from sugar and starch-rich 
plants, and fatty acid methyl esthers, or biodiesel, 
from vegetable oil. Biogas from various residues 
is an important niche. Using manure and waste as a 
70  Euroheat & Power (2006). Possibilities with More Dis-
trict Cooling in Europe. Main authors: Dalin, P. and 
Rubenhag, A. Ecoheatcool project. Brussels, Euroheat & 
Power.
71  EEA (2008a). Climate for a transport change, TERM 
2007: indicators tracking transport and environment in 
the European Union, EEA Report No 1/2008. Copenha-
gen, EEA.
substrate for biogas production creates a double benefit 
in terms of reduced GHG emissions compared to 
conventional handling, through limiting the leakage of 
methane as well as substituting fossil fuels. There are 
several examples of cities that are successfully using 
such biogas for fuelling local fleets of buses and other 
vehicles.
At the European level, biofuels have recently become 
subject to firm policy. In 2003, the Directive for the 
Promotion of Biofuels and Other Renewable Fuels 
(referred to as the Biofuels Directive) was adopted.72 
It requires Member States to support consumption 
of transport biofuels as a means to achieve 
policy objectives as ‘‘…meeting climate change 
commitments, environmentally friendly security of 
supply and promoting renewable energy sources’’ (Art. 
1). During 2007-08, the biofuels debate reached a new 
peak, fuelled by high and volatile oil prices as well as 
an increase in food prices during 2006-07 which was 
often blamed on increased biofuels production. The 
new RES directive adopted in 2008 stipulates that 
10 per cent of road transport fuel should come from 
renewable sources by 2020. 
An important condition for EU biofuels promotion is 
the inclusion of environmental safeguards in the form 
of sustainability criteria. Biofuels bring globalisation 
straight into our daily lives. Decisions on how to fuel 
our cars can have effects on the livelihoods of poor 
people in a completely different part of the world. 
Clearing land for producing energy crops can increase 
greenhouse gas emissions relative to continue using 
petroleum-derived fuels.73 Switching to energy crops 
even on existing arable land can cause displacement 
effects with similar but indirect effects on emissions. 
Without proper safeguards the expansion of biofuels 
may negatively affect biodiversity and water resources. 
Competition for feedstock, or land, can cause food 
prices to increase.74 But nevertheless, increased 
72  CEC (2003a). Directive 2003/30/EC on the promotion 
and use of biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport. 
Brussels, European Commission.
73  Börjesson, P. (2009a). Good or bad bioethanol from 
a greenhouse gas perspective - what determines this? 
Applied Energy. 86: 589-594.
74  RFA (2008). The Gallagher Review of the indirect effects 
of biofuels production. St Leonards-On-Sea, Renewable 
Fuels Agency.
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biofuels production need not be in conflict with high 
ambitions for sustainable development – what is needed 
is managing and governing the expansion of biofuels, 
including the use of proper safeguards.75
Biofuels are central to the eco-efficient economy 
agenda not only through their immediate link to 
climate change policy, but also in that they present an 
opportunity to modernise agriculture and develop a 
new industry. Up until the “tortilla crisis” in Mexico 
during 2006-07, the world market prices for food had 
essentially been decreasing for 30 years. Agricultural 
subsidies in the United States and the EU, resulting in 
surplus production, contributed to lower world market 
prices, while domestic markets and farmers remained 
shielded. Biofuels strategies have increased somewhat 
the global scarcity of land and contributed to higher 
food prices (which has been negative for the urban 
poor but frequently positive for the rural populations). 
However, higher food prices will also lead to new 
investments in agriculture, higher yields and new 
income opportunities – not least for the 880 million 
people in rural areas that live in poverty. Although the 
size of the potential for biofuels is debated, it is clearly 
significant when taking into account the amounts of 
idle arable land, potentials for yield increases and 
technology development.
Important industrial opportunities lie in the 
development of technologies for what is often called 
second generation biofuels. In this case, lignocellulosic 
and other feedstocks can be converted to fuels using 
gasification as well as biological conversion methods. 
The respective “thermochemical” and “carbohydrate” 
technology platforms are generic technologies with 
important applications outside the transport fuel area 
as well.76 For example, gasification is a key technology 
for facilitating pre-combustion carbon dioxide capture 
for storage in geological formations (CCS). The 
“carbohydrate” technology platform has a wide range of 
industrial biotechnology applications promising lower 
energy demand, less residues and higher productivity 
in the chemicals industry.
75  Börjesson, P. (2009b). Sustainable biofuels - do they 
exist?” Report No. 67, Environmental and Energy Sys-
tems Studies. Lund, Lund University.
76  Åhman, M. and L. J. Nilsson (2008). “Path-dependency 
and the future of advanced vehicles and biofuels.” Utili-
ties Policy 16: 80-89.
The commercial opportunities so far in the area of 
biofuels have been almost exclusively in the conversion 
of starch- and sugar-rich plants to ethanol through 
fermentation. In Europe and the US this expansion 
has been driven by subsidies and regulation. The 
second generation technologies have yet to take off. 
But there is no doubt that there are great expectations 
for innovation-driven growth in this area. One recent 
example is the $500 million Energy Biosciences 
Institute funded by BP. Intensified efforts by many key 
players may accelerate the development. Novozymes, 
for example, expect that be 2010 their enzymes will 
make it possible to convert waste and agricultural 
residues into second-generation bioethanol. The market 
for biofuels as well as other chemicals and materials 
from biological sources and advanced biocatalyctic 
processes is expected to grow rapidly.77
Many developing countries have strong comparative 
advantages for producing biofuels, and their role in 
the expansion of production should not be overlooked. 
Countries in South America and Southern Africa 
strongly support an expansion of biofuels to reduce 
their dependence on oil imports, bring economic 
development to rural areas and improve their trade 
balance. For Africa in particular, with its vast land 
areas, biofuels can be the entry ticket to the global 
trading arena.78 However, developing countries need to 
develop policies, for example to manage a variety of 
socio-economic issues and support the development of 
sustainable agriculture. The EU is not the only market 
for biofuels, but it can be an important one, and it can 
further the development of sustainable biofuels through 
proper trade and energy policies, including safeguards 
(such as sustainability criteria). European companies 
also have the economic capacity to invest in biofuels 
production around the world. 
77  German Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union (2007). The Cologne Paper: En Route to the 
Knowledge-based Bio-Economy, available at www.
europabio.org.
78  Virgin, I. (2008). Building a Regional Network and Com-
petence Platform for Bioresource Innovation in Eastern 
and Southern Africa. Stockholm, Stockholm Environ-
ment Institute.
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REnEwABlE ElECtRICIty – GovERnInG 
FoR tEChnoloGy AnD mARkEt 
DEvEloPmEnt
 
Electricity production is an environmentally disruptive 
activity, and the sector (including heat) accounts for 
29 per cent of CO2 emissions in the EU-15. The last 
decade has seen a strong push to “green” the electricity 
sector through the promotion of renewable sources 
of electricity (RES-E). The electricity industry is not 
subject to global competition and European firms have 
only relatively recently become subject to market 
conditions, following the on-going liberalisation that 
started in the 1990’s. Although it has been included in the 
new treaty, the EU has so far lacked formal competency 
in electricity policy. However, through internal market 
and environmental policies, it has still profoundly 
affected the sector. In the last decade there has also 
been a strong drive towards formulating a common 
European policy on renewable energy (including 
electricity), which today is encapsulated in the Climate 
& Energy Package, which contains an overall binding 
20 per cent renewable energy consumption target for 
the EU by 2020 allocated to different Member States 
(Figure 15) (see Chapter 4). 
Member States around Europe have put in place various 
support schemes and policy instruments to promote 
the deployment of renewable sources of energy, such 
as wind, solar and biomass. This support has led to 
Figure 15: renewable energy use and goals for 2020 in the Climate and energy Package of 2008
major enhancements in RES-E in Europe (Figure 15). 
The debate as to what measure is more effective to 
promote RES-E is unresolved to date and has led to 
a stalled development in the pursuit of a harmonised 
RES-E policy framework in the EU.79 In fact, the 27 
Member States operate 27 different support schemes. 
Policy instruments that are frequently used at the 
national level include the permitting procedure for 
new and enhanced installations, taxes, R&D support, 
investment support (capital subsidies) and operating 
support (price subsidies, certificates, tax exemption on 
consumption). Operating support is currently the most 
important support mechanism, and has lead to important 
advances in RES-E. Within this, two principal measures 
are currently used:80
Generic market-based instruments such as • 
certificates trading under a quota obligation, which 
has been implemented in 7 Member States. This 
fixes a quantity of RES-E to be achieved and 
facilitates this by issuing green certificates that can 
be traded (TRECs). 
79  Nilsson, M., L. J. Nilsson, et al. (2008). Rapid turns in 
European RES policy. Oslo, Fritjof Nansens Institut.
80  CEC (2008a). COM(2008)19 The support of electric-
ity from renewable energy sources. Brussels, European 
Commission.
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Technology-specific support measures coupled • 
with the obligation of distributors to purchase 
renewable electricity at a fixed price – so called 
feed-in tariffs or premiums (FITs). This system 
fixes a price for different RES-E categories and has 
been implemented in 18 Member States. 
In principle, the FIT fixes the price, whereas the 
TREC fixes the volume. But through their designs, the 
measures are pursuing partly differing objectives and 
are based on different policy perspectives. The TREC 
approach is primarily concerned with European internal 
market efficiency by way of delivering the renewable 
electricity technology that has the lower production 
cost most into the system. The FIT approach is based on 
innovation promotion and to nurturing new industries 
through providing long-term stability and price 
guarantees. The difference in perspective has also been 
discussed in terms of static efficiency versus dynamic 
efficiency, in that the innovation promotion approach 
may be considered to lead to more cost-efficient long-
term solutions.
Renewable energy does not only contribute to reduced 
CO2, but has also embodied new industrial opportunities 
and export potentials. Spain and Germany are two of the 
major EU countries deploying FIT. The two countries 
also account for most of the growth in European wind 
power capacity over the last decade, accounting for 
21,000 MW and 12,000 MW installed wind capacity, 
Figure 16: historical development of res 
electricity generation in the eu   
(Source CEC, 2008a)
out of the total EU capacity of 48,000.81 In 2008, 
Spain accounted for 41 per cent of the world market 
of installed solar power, installing 2460 MW out of the 
world total 5950 MW (Germany installed 1860 MW and 
the rest of Europe 310 MW).82 Spain’s current system 
of FIT was put in place in 1997 through the Electric 
Power Act 54/1997, and updated in the Royal Decree 
in 2004. The current premium for wind is 40 per cent 
of the average electricity tariff, and for solar 250 per 
cent.83 Complementary measures such as regulations 
requiring new housing to install solar panels provided 
additional triggers for the rapid expansion. 
The Spanish and German systems have induced a 
substantive increase in renewable electricity as well as 
helped create a new industry. Here, the importance of a 
domestic market nurturing the new industries is notable. 
In Germany, one of the leaders in renewable electricity, 
where renewable sources today account for ca 15 per 
cent of the electricity supply, the government estimates 
that the employment in renewable energy in 2007 was 
around 250,000 up from 160,000 in 2004. Of these, 
90,000 jobs are in the wind power industry. The total 
worth of the German RES export was €5.7 billion in 
2007, of which 5.1 billion was in wind power (equalling 
28 per cent of the world market).84 The contribution to 
GDP and employment overall in the EU is however still 
small: in 2005 renewable energies constituted about 
0.5 per cent of value added and 0.7 per cent of overall 
employment.85 Germany introduced FIT in 1990. Later, 
further legislation was introduced, improving the status 
and demand of renewable energy, as well as green 
taxes, all of which led to increased consumption of 
renewable energy. Lately, the German government has 
also supported various projects to support the export of 
renewable energy technologies. Another wind power 
success is Denmark which has the highest share of wind 
power of overall national power production, at ca 20 per 
81  EUROSTAT (2009). Energy, Transport and Environment 
Indicators. Luxemburg, EUROSTAT.
82  Solarbuzz LCC (2009). Marketbuzz 2009. www.solar-
buzz.com/Marketbuzz2009.htm.
83  Ragwitz, M. and C. Huber (not dated). Feed-In Systems 
in Germany and Spain: a comparison. Karlsruhe, Fraun-
hofer Institut.
84  Bruttobeschäftigung 2007 by Marlene Kratzat, Dietmar 
Edler, Marion Ottmüller and Ulrike Lehr
85  Ragwitz, M. and e. al (2008). Employment and growth 
impacts of renewable energies in Europe 
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cent (compared to Spain’s 10 per cent and Germany’s 
6 per cent)86. The Danish wind power business grew 
from ca €400 million to €5 billion from 1996 to 2006. 
The Danish firm Vestas is a world leader in wind power 
engineering with over 20,000 employees.
EU Member States who have chosen the TREC system 
to promote renewable energy include the UK, Sweden, 
Italy and Belgium. Sweden’s TREC system started in 
2003, in the form of a renewable portfolio standard 
with electricity certificate trading. Sweden’s TREC 
system has been criticized for not inducing a strong 
growth in wind power. Nonetheless, as it has become 
clear that the system will be extended another 10 years 
investors have become more confident, and recent 
figures demonstrate that wind power investments have 
been taking off very rapidly (STEM; 2008). It can be 
observed that Swedish certificate-plus-electricity prices 
have been far lower than not only German wind tariffs 
but also German tariffs on biofuels.87 However, it 
should be noted that the comparison is difficult to make: 
much of the certificates in Sweden were allocated to 
existing production capacity, where there was a great 
deal of unexplored capacity in combined heat and 
power production. Nevertheless, one can expect there 
to be some truth in the theoretical assertion that the 
TREC system induces a stronger competitive pressure 
between different generation technologies to stimulate 
cost-efficient designs. Such a pressure is not present in 
the feed-in system where revenue is secured. Therefore, 
proponents of TREC argue that maintaining FIT systems 
for too long may slow down technology development 
and forego efficiency potentials. In the FIT system the 
competitive pressure instead lies within each power 
generation technology, for instance between different 
equipment manufacturers and suppliers, although due 
to production capacity constraints the last few years, 
this pressure has been rather weak. 
The renewable electricity case shows that it is possible 
to stimulate innovations and create competitive 
advantage by means of supporting policy initiatives. 
Both FIT and TREC have contributed to considerable 
86  2006 figures from IEA statistics, at www.iea.org 
87  Midttun, A. and K. Gautesen (2007). “Feed in or cer-
tificates, competition or complementarity? Combining a 
static efficiency and a dynamic innovation perspective on 
the greening of the energy industry.” Energy Policy 35: 
1419-1422.
market expansion, the emergence of learning networks 
and growing political strength of industry associations 
for suppliers and owners of renewable electricity 
generation. Such institutional change has cemented 
European leadership in renewable electricity. However, 
it should also be noted that this leadership comes at a 
cost, as it implies politically orchestrated transfers of 
resources between stakeholders (i.e. from electricity 
consumers or tax payers to renewable industries). The 
systems are therefore contingent on strong political 
support.
Like for the automotive case that follows directly 
below, renewable electricity demonstrates that market-
based systems, whether generic or technology specific, 
are most effective when supplemented by a broad 
portfolio of support measures. Both the FIT and the 
TREC scheme have merits, as many countries in Europe 
have been able to develop competitive advantages in 
RES-E technologies that are now possible to build 
export industries around and enhance Europe’s 
competitiveness overall as well as help mitigate climate 
change globally. However, they operate under different 
assumptions about technology maturity. The lesson is 
the importance of adapting governance to the different 
stages of evolution and maturity for eco-efficient 
technological systems.
AutomotIvE InDuStRy – ComBInInG 
GovERnAnCE FoR InnovAtIon
Although the automotive industry is now in decline, 
it has until recently been the world’s single largest 
manufacturing sector.88 European car manufacturing 
constitutes 7.5 per cent of the manufacturing sector and 
employs 2 million directly while indirect employment 
has been estimated to another 10 million.89 Future 
predictions for the car industry are futile in the current 
state of financial crisis and great turbulence in this 
sector, but it is safe to say that Europe will remain highly 
dependant on this sector in the future. However, Europe 
along with the US and Japan is facing new competition 
88  Köhler, J., L. Whitmarsh, et al. (2008). Can the car 
makers save the planet? Innovation for a low carbon 
economy: Economic, institutional and management 
approaches. T. Foxon, J. Köhler and C. Oughton. Chel-
tenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar.
89  European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/
automotive/pagesbackground/sectoralanalysis/index.htm
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and all of the old dominating manufacturers are losing 
ground globally. The industry has had a profound impact 
of societal and economical development and important 
consequences for the environment. During the 1970’s 
and 80’s, local pollution (HC, CO, and NOx) was the 
key concern, spurring regulations worldwide pioneered 
by the US 1970 Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments. 
From the mid 1990’s, CO2 emissions has become the 
most pressing concern. 
Global competition and economies of scale have 
pushed car manufacturers to ever-increasing production 
efficiency including larger production units and firms, 
and smaller margins. In this sense the sector is very 
mature. However, new polices and consumer pressure 
for further improvements still induce eco-efficient 
technological developments. There are still energy 
efficiency potentials in the order of 30 per cent to be 
made in further developing the standard gasoline Internal 
Combustion Engine (ICE) (less for the diesel engine), 
without considering ongoing and new technological 
breakthroughs such as hybrid technology. Hybridisation 
adds an additional improvement potential of 30-50 per 
cent, a total improvement potential in the order of 60 
per cent90,91. Indeed, the industry is experiencing a 
growing pressure to realise this room for improvement 
and innovation in terms of both energy efficiency and 
solutions that radically reduce CO2 emissions. A wide 
range of polices have been applied: Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy standards (or corresponding standards 
on CO2 emissions); differentiated vehicles taxation over 
environmental performance; fuel/energy taxes; market 
enabling support such as public procurement, R&D, 
subsidies, soft loans to industry etc.; and technology-
forcing standards are the key categories. 
One regulatory standard-setting measure that induced 
and shaped technology change in an entire industry, was 
the emissions standards applied in California. Through 
its early introductions of a range of standards on sulfur 
and lead content in fuels, ozone, and more recently 
CO2 emissions and “zero-emission vehicles”, the State 
of California is usually considered a forerunner in the 
90  Romm, J. (2006). “The car and fuel of the future.” 
Energy Policy 34(17): 2609-2614.
91  Johansson, B. and M. Åhman (2002). “A comparison 
of technologies for carbon-neutral passenger transport.” 
Transportation Research Part D 7: 175-196.
US and globally on air pollution policy.92 The range of 
measures implemented by the Californian Air Resource 
Board was replicated at the federal level technological 
standards in the US, and lead to technology development. 
Catalysts were rapidly developed and introduced at the 
US market due to the CAA requirements of 90 per cent 
reductions in tailpipe emissions and adopted technology 
standards on the catalytic converter (1975) and the 
three-way catalyst (1981). With a Swedish perspective 
on this example of technology innovation driven by 
policy, it is worth mentioning that Volvo was the fist 
manufacturer to introduce the three-way catalyst with 
the Lambda Sond in 1976. 
Moving to the issue of energy and an eco-efficient 
economy agenda, a contrasting story emerges. At the 
federal level, the US has not yet forced stricter energy 
efficiency standards, and only recently have some 
states enhanced this instrument. The results of this lack 
of interest in efficiency have led to notable impacts on 
US car industry competitiveness.93 With less domestic 
regulatory pressure on the US owners, smaller engines 
were not considered a priority in the model programs. 
By contrast, in the EU, taxes and standards in individual 
Member States are significantly higher, an EU directive 
on minimum taxes on motor fuel (petrol and diesel) 
apply to all Member States, and the voluntarily and not 
fulfilled commitments from European car manufactures 
on average emissions from new cars has been replaced 
by mandatory legislation. The compromise resulted in 
a requirement to reduce CO2 emissions to an average 
of 120gCO2/km for all cars by 2015 (phased out from 
2012 with 65 per cent of new cars complying).94 The 
Porter hypothesis appears to get some support in this 
development: combined and continued pressure on 
the industry appears to have resulted in European car 
92  Gerard, D. and L. B. Lave (2005). “Implementing tech-
nology-forcing policies: The 1970 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments and the introduction of advanced automotive emis-
sions controls in the United States.” Technological Fore-
casting & Social Change 72: 761–778.
93  Clerides, S. and T. Zachariadis (2008). “The effect of 
standards and fuel prices on automobile fuel economy: 
An international analysis.” Energy Economics 20: 2657-
2672.
94  European Parliament (2007). “Council of the European 
Union Interinstitutional File 2007/0019 (COD).” Availa-
ble at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st16/
st16721.en08.pdf 
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manufacturers keeping up with global competition 
comparatively well, and for the last 10 years they have 
increased their market share relative to the US. 
In terms of choices of policy instruments it is interesting 
to note that although the voluntary agreement might 
have contributed to this development, the mechanism 
was on its own not strong enough to reach the target. 
As to be discussed in Chapter 4, this demonstrates 
the important role of regulatory standard-setting to 
foster innovation and enhance eco-efficiency while 
maintaining competitiveness. However, a quick view 
on the Japanese car manufacturers (Toyota in particular) 
shows how an even more active and combined approach 
to governance was a factor in Toyota’s successful global 
introduction of the hybrid electric vehicle “Prius”. With 
160 thousand Prius cars sold in the US during 2008 
and 128 thousand in Europe in addition to the domestic 
market in Japan, the global cumulative sales passed 
1 million in April 2008 making Prius the dominating 
model and Toyota the leading manufacturer. The policy 
regime in Japan includes the elements of standard-setting 
and taxation from the US and Europe, but had a greater 
range of support programs for battery, hybrid, and fuel 
cell vehicles. This involved not only persistent and 
strategic R&D efforts, but infrastructure, early market 
support in the form of public procurement, and large 
range of supporting projects and collaborations across 
industry facilitated by the government. Importantly, the 
government created both stricter tail-pipe regulations 
and actively worked with visions and targets, analysing 
the future development of the industry.95  The strength of 
integrated policy efforts can also bee seen in the recent 
breakthrough of biofuel cars in Sweden. In this case the 
range of policy instruments (taxes, subsidies, and local 
initiatives in terms of free parking and exemptions from 
congestion charges) on road transport has had a large 
impact and the Swedish car fleet no longer has the worst 
CO2 performance in EU.
96
Finally, it should be emphasised that the challenges 
for the transport sector worldwide is huge, and a long 
95  Åhman, M. (2006). “Government policy and the devel-
opment of electric vehicles in Japan.” Energy Policy 34: 
433–443.
96  Nykvist, B. and L. Whitmarsh (2008). “A multi-level 
analysis of sustainable mobility transitions: Niche devel-
opment in the UK and Sweden.” Technological Forecast-
ing and Social Change 75(9): 1373-1387.
term solution without fossil fuelled cars is intimately 
linked to the sustainability of the wider energy sector, as 
discussed in the biofuels example. Both near-term and 
long-term efficiency potentials are however great. For 
example, some scholars believe that hybrids will be a 
dominating platform already in 202097, and in addition 
substantial improvements would be made by further 
encouraging a shift to smaller-sized engines. Continued 
regulatory pressure for energy efficiency will most 
likely benefit both climate change mitigation, security 
of supply, innovation, and competitiveness, making the 
sector a centrepiece in the eco-efficient economy. In 
the more distant future, a new regime of cars including 
electrical drive trains offers significant higher energy 
efficiency; but it is very difficult, if not impossible, to 
conclude on optimal technological choices (a matter 
of much academic debate). Polices for eco-efficiency 
should therefore as a starting point be technology 
neutral and use a mix of instruments. However, forward-
looking polices and visions have proven successful and 
as the Japanese dedication to pursue new solutions 
illustrates; commitment is necessary to foster initial 
developments.
SuStAInABlE CItIES – SyStEmS EFFICIEnCy 
oPPoRtunItIES In uRBAn AREAS
Europe is the world’s most urbanised continent, with 
approximately 75 per cent of the European population 
living in urban areas. Although many European cities are 
declining, by 2020 it is estimated that approximately 80 
per cent of Europe’s inhabitants will live in urban areas. 
Most human and economic activities, and thus a large 
share of the energy consumption and the emissions of 
greenhouse gases, take place in urban areas, making 
cities key players in tackling the climate challenge. Cities 
can, through their associated lifestyles, be a burden on 
natural resources if they are not properly planned. At 
the same time, cities tend to be more resource efficient 
than nations on a per capita basis and have substantial 
potential to further increase this resource efficiency. 
For European cities, energy consumption in buildings 
accounts for the largest percentage of total energy use. As 
discussed previously, there is a need both for increased 
energy efficiency as well as a switch to renewable 
energy sources in order to tackle this challenge. 
97  Romm, J. (2006). “The car and fuel of the future.” 
Energy Policy 34(17): 2609-2614.
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Both these issues have been key targets addressed in 
Freiburg, Germany. In the 1970s, local opposition 
against a planned nuclear plant close to Freiburg led 
to the adoption of a series of ambitious environmental 
energy policies, including a support program for 
home insulation and energy efficiency retrofits, and a 
requirement that all new houses must meet low-energy 
efficiency standards. Such houses cost about 3 per cent 
more to build, but the energy costs are reduced by 30 
per cent.98 The interaction between these local policies 
and the national frameworks, including the national 
feed-in energy policy has played an important role to 
achieve the fruitful environment for solar power in the 
region.99 Companies as well as expertise in the field of 
solar energy have been attracted to the region and solar 
technology in Freiburg has created over 1000 new jobs 
in 80 business operations.100 The environmental targets 
have been focused even more strongly in the newly 
built urban extension area, Vauban, where all buildings 
must be low-energy and many of them are zero energy 
or energy plus buildings with solar and photovoltaic 
panels producing energy. Austria has through a 
private-public partnership program called “Building of 
Tomorrow” developed a standard for energy-efficient 
buildings. The standard states, among other things, that 
from 2015 only new residential buildings with passive 
house, or comparable, standard will be funded through 
the province housing subsidy programme.101
In many cities there is a growing interest for energy 
produced locally, which can lead to smaller distribution 
and transmission losses and decreases the vulnerability 
of energy supply. In Barcelona, Spain, a program aimed 
at reduced energy use and increased percentage of 
renewable energy sources has been implemented. This 
program includes promotion policies, demonstration 
projects, legal and management instruments as well 
as the integration of energy measures into the urban 
development. As mentioned in the case on renewable 
electricity, since 2006, solar panel installations are 
98  http://madisonfreiburg.org/sustainablecity.htm
99  Hopwood, D. (2007). “Blueprint for sustainability? What 
lessons can we learn from Freiburg’s inclusive approach 
to sustainable development? .” Refocus 8(3): 54-57.
100 Breyer, F., M. Halter, et al. (2008). Freiburg Green City 
Freiburg Wirtschaft Touristik und Messe GmbH & Co. 
KG.  .
101 http://umwelt.lebensministerium.at/filemanager/down-
load/38116/
mandatory for all new and renovated buildings, to 
supply at least 60 per cent of the energy needed to heat 
water. District heating as described in the case above 
may be an option where appropriate – though, also as 
illustrated in the case, it requires initial large investment 
at inception.
New, innovative building designs and areas as the one 
in Freiburg can achieve significant reductions in energy 
use. However, significant improvements can often be 
made also to the existing building stock. In Nyíregyháza 
in Hungary, a number of retrofitting programmes have 
led to an energy saving of 68 per cent.102 In addition to the 
reduction in energy use, retrofitting of existing houses 
have also brought about cost savings. In Berlin, energy 
saving partnerships between public house owners and 
contractors led to decreases in emissions of greenhouse 
gases from the buildings corresponding to about 
100,000 tons between 1996 and 2002.103 The contractor 
carries out efficiency measures such as central building 
control systems to decrease energy consumption. The 
investments made by the contractor are financed by the 
achieved energy savings. Any remaining savings are 
shared by the partners. 
After energy use in buildings, transportation accounts 
for the second largest share of cities’ greenhouse gas 
emissions. Motorized transportation in cities does not 
only lead to greenhouse gas emissions. It is also largely 
a health issue. About 550,000 premature deaths each 
year are related to human exposure to fine particulate 
matters.104 In some cities, this means that average 
life expectancy is reduced by two years. In addition, 
exposure to noise is associated with increased risk of 
heart disease and impacts on mental health. In contrast 
to US cities, European cities are traditionally more 
compact since they were shaped before the emergence 
102 EEA (2009). Ensuring Quality of Life in Europe’s Cit-
ies and Towns. Tackling the Environmental Challenges 
driven by European and Global Change. Copenhagen, 
European Environmental Agency.
103 Berliner Energieagentur GmbH (2002). Performance 
Contracting. Energy Saving Partnership. A Berlin Suc-
cess Model., Berlin Senate Department of Urban Devel-
opment.
104 EEA (2009). Ensuring Quality of Life in Europe’s Cit-
ies and Towns. Tackling the Environmental Challenges 
driven by European and Global Change. Copenhagen, 
European Environmental Agency.
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of automobiles. Compact cities are more energy efficient 
and emit less carbon dioxide. In this way, European 
cities have the potential to provide public transportation 
and short distances that make walking and bicycling 
viable options. 
In an increasing number of European cities, the need 
to reduce pollution due to motorized vehicle traffic is 
acknowledged. In London for example, the introduction 
of congestion charges reduced car use by 15 per cent. In 
Bologna, Italy, the historic city centre has been closed 
for car traffic and is open for buses only.105 In Pécs, 
Hungary, a car free zone has been established in the area 
that UNESCO has designated as a World Heritage site. In 
Freiburg, in addition to energy saving activities and the 
switch to renewable energy sources, the city’s efforts in 
the environmental arena covers a number of other areas. 
A cycling plan was drawn up in 1970, which has led to 
that Freiburg has now over 500 km of bicycle paths and 
over 5000 bicycle parking spaces. About a third of all 
journeys are made by bicycle.106 The old town centre 
became car-free in 1973 and 30 kmph zones have been 
introduced for almost all residential streets. However, 
in many cities in the new Member States, the trend is 
towards increased use of private cars. This is related 
to the economic growth and policies that prioritize the 
construction of urban freeways and parking spaces. 
It is important to ensure that cities with lower car use 
and fuel use per person take a positive track and do not 
increase car use and instead build infrastructure that 
supports other modes of transportation.
The challenges faced and the potential possessed by 
cities is recognized by the European Covenant of 
Mayors initiative, in which participating cities are 
committed to go beyond the climate targets set for 
2020, reducing their emissions by at least 20 per cent. 
The opportunities that cities possess are also identified 
by the Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities, 
as well as by the Aalborg Commitment. An increasing 
number of cities have joined the Covenant of Mayors, 
and several cities are seeking solutions to become more 
resource efficient, to reduce energy use and greenhouse 
gas emissions. 
105 German Institute of Urban Affairs (2007). Sustainable 
Urban Transport and deprived urban areas. Good Prac-
tice Examples in Europe. Berlin, German Institute of 
Urban Affairs.
106 http://madisonfreiburg.org/sustainablecity.htm
As in the case with the Berlin partnership programme, 
sustainability initiatives do not need to be costly but 
can instead lead to cost savings, a fact which is also 
recognized by for example the European Commission 
Green Building Programme. In addition, there is here a 
substantial potential for growth for companies operating 
in fields such as renewable energy, waste and water 
treatment. Reduced car use leads both to decreased 
emissions and improved health for citizens, thereby 
decreasing costs for society. 
There are several promising examples that can be 
scaled up and applied in other cities. At the same 
time, geographical, economic and cultural differences, 
requires specific adaptations. Cities are multifaceted, 
and sustainable city planning entails a web of 
opportunities and dilemmas, involving a wide range 
of environmental and socio-economic aspects. Cities 
need to deal with efficient waste water treatment, waste 
handling, transportation, energy supply and use and 
ensuring a healthy environment for citizens. Ideally, 
cities should aim for a circular, rather than a linear 
metabolism, minimise fossil fuel use and material 
inputs, and maximise recycling and reuse of energy, 
water and materials. At the same time, cities need to 
ensure eco-friendly interactions with surrounding areas. 
To address all these aspects, sustainable city planning 
requires an integrated approach. Just like for many 
national and European wide policy areas, sustainable 
cities need better analytical tools and knowledge support 
to understand the systems implications of different 
planning alternatives. 
ChEmICAlS InDuStRy – A EuRoPEAn 
hyBRID GovERnAnCE APPRoACh
The chemical sector presents a particular challenge from 
an eco-efficient economy perspective: a large sector 
with an inherently energy-intensive production process, 
a competitive global market, and comparatively weak 
regulation outside the EU make it difficult to couple 
environmental enhancements with competitiveness. 
These environmental and governance challenges for 
chemical control have, however, led to a substantively 
and procedurally innovative European chemicals 
policy. 
In Europe, the chemical sector constitutes the third 
largest manufacturing industry, providing 1.7 million 
jobs and indirectly employing a further three million 
people. Globally, the EU is an important player, 
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producing 31 per cent of the world’s chemicals, 
including both market-leading multinationals as well as 
around 36,000 small and medium-sized companies. As 
the sector is a large consumer of energy – on average, 9 
per cent of the total production costs are due to energy 
use107 – it is inevitably impacted by the EU’s Kyoto 
and other climate commitments. Industry organisations 
point out that the chemical industry actively contributes 
to solutions that save energy and CO2 emissions, and 
that although chemical productions in Europe have 
increased by more than 50 per cent since 1990, the 
corresponding emissions of greenhouse gases have been 
reduced by more than 20 per cent, which equals about 
one third of the EU’s target under the Kyoto Protocol.108 
However, the sector is still a large energy consumer and 
will thus have to be creative in furthering its efforts, 
through for example making use of emergent carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) technology and actively 
seeking renewable alternatives.
Beyond reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the sector 
also faces environmental challenges related to chemical 
impacts. Although there was a regulatory procedure 
also before REACH concerning chemical uses, there is 
still a lack of knowledge about end uses and possible 
hazardous properties of most of the approximately 
30,000 substances currently on the European market. 
During the 1990’s, EU production volumes of toxic 
chemicals, i.e. those classified as carcinogenic, 
teratogenic, mutagenic and reprotoxic, increased along 
with the total chemical production,109 although part of 
the increase was due to re-classification of some of the 
chemicals.
Since 2006, the main policy tool for chemicals in 
the EU is the REACH (Registration, Evaluation, and 
Authorisation of Chemicals) system.110 The aim of 
REACH is two-fold: to improve protection of human 
health and environment from the risks of chemicals, 
while enhancing the competitiveness of the EU 
107 Appe (2008). Climate change and the petrochemical 
industry, Position paper, Association of petrochemicals 
producers (appe) in Europe.
108 CEFIC (2006). The Chemical Industry helps to protect 
the climate. Information material. Brussels, European 
Chemical Industry Council (Cefic).
109 European Environment Agency, 2003
110  European Council Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006, 
adopted 18 December 2006
chemicals industry. In other words, REACH aspires 
to an eco-efficient economy agenda. REACH replaced 
40 pieces of existing legislation and creates one single 
system for all types of substances – a level playing field 
for existing and new chemicals. While the two-fold aim 
of the REACH legislation can be endorsed by most 
stakeholders, the translation of the aim into specific 
regulations and exemptions has been intensely debated, 
starting already with the release of the White paper on a 
new chemicals strategy from the Commission in 2001, 
and continuing into the last discussions in the European 
Parliament when REACH was finally adopted in 
December, 2006. Industry organisations actively 
opposed many aspects of REACH while many civil 
society organisations called it under-ambitious.111,112 
While the European chemicals industry feared to 
lose competitiveness on the global market because of 
REACH, industry organisations in other regions were 
preoccupied with the prospect of REACH influencing 
regulations in countries outside the EU. 
For most sectors, innovation, competitiveness, and eco-
efficiency are understood as closely linked, and for some 
industrial processes, substantial gains may be made by 
adopting an eco-efficiency scheme at the company level. 
For instance, in the implementation of the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
it was realised that in some industrial processes the use 
of ozone depleting solvents for cleaning of metal parts 
could be greatly reduced or even removed by changes in 
the production process. This is clearly an eco-efficient 
measure, costing less to achieve the same substantive 
result, with environmental benefits. Examples are also 
found in the chemical industry. BASF, one of the world’s 
largest chemical groups, has developed an eco-efficiency 
tool which identifies processes and products that use 
the fewest resources to deliver a more economical 
product. This tool has been applied to many products 
and processes, such as for example the indigo dying of 
blue jeans. In this case, five alternative dying processes 
were evaluated using the eco-efficiency analysis, after 
which the more eco-efficient alternative was launched 
as a new product. BASF has also developed an “Eco-
111  Appe (2008). Climate change and the petrochemical 
industry, Position paper, Association of petrochemicals 
producers (appe) in Europe.
112  CEFIC (2006). The Chemical Industry helps to protect 
the climate. Information material. Brussels, European 
Chemical Industry Council (Cefic).
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Efficiency” label for those products that have passed the 
analytical process which includes third party evaluation 
and the publication of test results. 
However, for the chemicals industry, energy savings 
and emission reductions are often more costly. The 
continued work towards reduced greenhouse gas 
emissions and harmful effects of chemicals then 
demands close dialogue between different stakeholders, 
to find the appropriate balance between regulation 
and support to the sector. This type of coordination 
and consultation with stakeholders has arguably been 
achieved in the substance and process of REACH. 
Between the initial White paper and the adoption of 
REACH, stakeholders including industry and civil 
society were widely consulted in the preparation and 
implementation of the system. While on the one hand, 
the outcome might appear to take a traditional command 
and control approach to regulation (see the discussion 
of governance approaches in Chapter 4), as it places a 
heavy burden on the chemical sector to produce data and 
reserves the option for top-down restriction, a second 
look points to more creative and diversified governance 
mechanisms. These include reliance on self-regulation: 
the data submitted in the REACH “Registration” phase 
and used at the “Evaluation” phase is collected and 
reported by manufacturers and importers themselves. 
REACH also emphasises devolution: in providing a 
framework of basic rules and procedures, it leaves many 
decisions including defining standards, operational 
criteria and procedural guidance to the national and 
European implementing bodies.113 
Thus, REACH employs both traditional and new forms 
of steering to achieve multiple aims: environmental 
and human health protection, as well as economic 
efficiency – mitigating the cost burden on the chemical 
sector and thus maintaining the competitiveness of 
the European chemical sector on the world market.  A 
long series of competing cost-benefit analyses were 
commissioned during the REACH negotiation process, 
by actors including the European Commission, private 
research firms, governments, NGOs and industry. The 
Commission’s impact assessment assessed the direct 
costs of REACH for the chemical industry to be €2.3 
113  Hey, C. and J. Volkery (2007). “Better regulation by 
new governance hybrids? Governance models and reform 
of European chemicals policy.” Journal of Cleaner Pro-
duction 15: 1859-1874.
billion from 2006-2017.114 The same report estimated 
total costs including those to downstream users to reach 
between €2.8 and 5.2 billion for the same time frame. 
These costs are to be weighed against the human health 
and environmental benefits. The impact assessment 
provides a rough estimate for human health benefits at 
€50 billion over 30 years, while a DG Environment study 
suggested that less-easily quantified but nevertheless 
significant benefits would take the form of reduced 
air, water and soil pollution, as well as biodiversity 
preservation.115 
In regulating the chemical sector, different variables of 
the eco-efficiency equation have been emphasised by 
different actors including governments, industry and 
civil society. REACH is a hybrid governance structure 
set out to optimise the protection of human health and 
the environment while maintaining industry efficiency 
and not disregarding economic factors. The process 
facilitates engagement of stakeholders and makes use 
of integrated impact assessment procedures. 
StEEl InDuStRy – ISSuES towARDS low-
CARBon PRoCESSES
The EU is the second largest steel producer after China, 
with a production representing about 15-16 per cent 
of the world output, including crude steel, finished 
steel products, steel tubes and iron steel foundry 
production.116 In 2005, the total value of the output 
from the industry of the EU-25 states was roughly 2.5 
per cent of the total value of the industrial production 
within the countries.117 About 25 per cent of the steel 
produced in the world is traded internationally, and 
trade plays an increasing role in the steel market.118 
114  CEC (2003b). Extended Impact Assessment of the 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisa-
tion and Restrictions of Chemicals (REACH). European 
Commission, Brussels.
115  CEC (2003c). The Impact of the New Chemicals Policy 
on Health and the Environment. Brussels, European 
Commission.
116  ECOFYS (2008). Study on the Competitiveness of the 
European Steel Sector. Brussels, European Commissioin.
117  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/steel/index_en.htm
118  IEA (2007). Sectoral Approaches to Greenhouse Gas 
Mitigation- Exploring Issues for Heavy Industry. Paris, 
IEA/OECD.
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Yet, the domestic market is the most important for 
European steel producers. Since the 1980’s when a 
large share of the industry was state owned, the EU 
steel sector has undergone a transformation. During the 
1980’s and 1990’s, the industry was deregulated. Along 
with this privatisation came increased emphasis on 
productivity and technological innovation. Today, the 
EU steel sector is a modern, customer-oriented industry, 
dominated by large, multinational companies, and with 
competitiveness largely linked to the markets for high 
quality products.
The EU as a whole has traditionally been an exporter 
of steel but during the last few years, the region has 
become a net importer – the EU is now the third biggest 
exporter and the first importer of steel products. At the 
same time, global steel production has increased in 
recent years driven in particular by demand in China. 
The increase in world steel prices has led to an increase 
in total EU turnover, despite the decline in global market 
share. The demand for steel is likely to increase over the 
coming years, due to demand from China, India, Brazil 
and Russia. However, the competition from emerging 
economies, in particular China, represents a major 
challenge for EU production. In the longer perspective, 
there is even a risk for excess supply when emerging 
economy infrastructure growth slows down.
In addition to the challenge of increased global 
competition, another challenge is how to achieve stricter 
climate targets and handle the rising costs connected to 
new environmental policies. As in the chemical sector, 
steel production processes are energy-intensive, and 
emissions from the steel industry represent about 6 
per cent of European anthropogenic CO2 emissions. 
However, significant achievements have been made to 
increase the energy efficiency and decrease emissions 
of CO2 from the steel industry. Over the last 50 years, 
the European steel industry has cut emissions by 50 per 
cent.119 This has been achieved by improving efficiency 
in the technologies used. Carbon-containing materials, 
such as coal and coke, are in steel production used not 
only as a source of energy, but also as a reducing agent to 
reduce iron ore to iron, a process which also emits CO2. 
While the energy sources can be switched to non-fossil 
ones, replacing carbon for the reduction of iron ore has 
119  CEC (2004b). European Steel Technology Platform. 
Vision 2030. Report of the Group of Personalities. Brus-
sels, European Commission.
proven to be more difficult. In order to reach further 
improvements and reductions in CO2 emissions, the 
industry invests in long term research and development 
projects, for instance in carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) applications, where carbon dioxide is captured 
and stored in geological reservoirs. 
There is a fear within the industry that measures to 
reduce emissions due to environmental policies, in 
particular the European Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS), will lead to increased costs. In addition to 
the direct effects of the EU ETS on the iron and steel 
industry, there are also indirect effects due to increased 
price of electricity, since also electricity production is 
included in the EU ETS. The international competition 
exposure implies that costs of mitigating CO2 emissions 
may lead to competitive disadvantages in terms of 
factor cost. This in may force industries to relocate 
production to countries outside the EU without the 
same constraints on emissions, or cause imports of 
high energy intensive production from outside of the 
EU to increase. The emission reductions achieved by 
the introduced policy may thus be offset by emissions 
from increased production in other parts of the world. 
This concept is known as carbon leakage, a problem 
also for other energy-intensive industries exposed to 
international trade, such as aluminium and (to some 
extent) cement.120  
To avoid carbon leakage, as well as to achieve further 
emission reductions from the sector, international 
agreements as well as other policy measures are 
needed. A number of mechanisms have been suggested 
to deal with carbon leakage and to level the playing 
field between companies within and outside the EU, 
including a) free allocation of emission allowances to 
the affected sectors; b) support for investment and re-
investment with state aid; c) border adjustments for 
carbon prices; and d) sectoral agreements to create the 
same carbon price for all competing firms.121 
120 Reinaud, J. (2009). Trade, Competitiveness and Car-
bon Leakage: Challenges and Opportunities. London, 
Chatham House.
121 European Parliament’s Temporary Committee on Cli-
mate Change (2008). Competitive distortions and leakage 
in a world of different carbon prices. Trade, competitive-
ness and employment challenges when meeting the post - 
2012 climate commitments in the European Union. Brus-
sels, European Parliament.
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Free allocations of allowances to sectors that may be 
affected by carbon leakage were suggested as part of the 
now adopted climate and energy package. However, free 
allowances reduce the incentive for early investments in 
energy efficiency. In addition, free allowance allocation 
and state aid may create administrative constraints 
that reduce the effectiveness of carbon pricing. Border 
adjustments have been suggested as a way to avoid 
leakage by adjusting imports and exports for the 
difference in carbon price. This could take the form of 
a tax or as an extension of the EU ETS, by requiring 
importers to purchase and surrender allowances on 
imported goods. However, while the idea seems 
simple, the politics and the implementation are more 
complicated. International sectoral agreements with 
binding targets for entire sectors could lead to emission 
reductions and address leakage concerns, but would 
in such cases be complex to negotiate and implement. 
However, sectoral agreements could also take the form 
of sharing best practices and benchmarking across 
regions and countries. As such, sectoral agreements 
could potentially lead to emission reductions and at the 
same time accelerate international cooperation towards 
a global deal. The sectoral approach has the advantage 
of responding to concerns regarding competitiveness of 
incumbent industries that are exposed to international 
competition while at the same time making them subject 
to strict emissions targets. Second, it is also promoted 
by emerging economies as a key for them to make 
commitments.122 Third, it may enhance effectiveness 
of mitigation overall by taking into account from the 
bottom-up different sectors’ potentials.123
Although the problem of leakage is seen as an economic 
threat within the industry, for the EU as a whole as well 
as globally, the more general concern is that relocation 
of emissions undermines the goal to mitigate emissions. 
When climate policies result in relocation rather than 
reduction of emissions, as well as job losses in the area 
with the policies, the result may be a loss of domestic 
and international support for such policies. Nevertheless, 
measures to avoid such leakage could also undermine 
climate policies, if they are regarded as protectionist. 
122 IEA (2007). Sectoral Approaches to Greenhouse Gas 
Mitigation- Exploring Issues for Heavy Industry. Paris, 
IEA/OECD.
123 Schmidt and et al (2008). “Sector-based approach to the 
post 2012 climate change policy architecture.” Climate 
Policy 8: 494-515.
Figure 17: source: Global steel production 
versus scrap consumption     (Source: Eurofer)
Thus, such measures need to be chosen carefully, 
and preceded by analyses for each specific sector. 
The challenge here is for the EU not only to enhance 
domestic governance in the steel sector, but also to 
demonstrate that this is possible without the domestic 
industry suffering competitiveness losses. 
Sectoral mechanisms, ETS and carbon leakage are 
important factors to consider when resolving the steel 
sector’s contribution to the eco-efficient economy. In 
the long run, it is hard to escape the imperative for a 
global carbon pricing. However, in the short term there 
are still significant improvements to make in current 
business practices. One aspect is a stronger closing 
of the loop in the steel sector, through enhancing the 
recycling rates as far as possible – steel being a 100 
per cent recyclable material that can be reused many 
times without losing its properties. This substitutes the 
use of raw material (iron ore) and saves energy. Figure 
17 shows the development of the gap between steel 
production and scrap consumption globally. Due to 
longevity of steel products, this gap cannot be closed, 
but there is room for improvement.
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Chapter 3 identified efforts and achievements of different sectors in different stages of 
transformation toward a more eco-efficient economy. 
As shown, this transformation requires change in the 
way in which economic activities are carried out – 
through innovations in technology, systems changes, 
and changes in behaviour. These changes do not 
occur automatically. Rather, they happen as a result 
of governance interventions of different kinds, either 
through private or public initiative. 
Policy is but one manifestation of the broader issue of 
governance. When discussing the range of available 
measures to influence and enhance eco-efficiency in the 
European economy – to ask the question, “how can we 
‘do’ policies to enable an eco-efficient economy?” – it 
is necessary also to talk about “who?”. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, in contrast to the narrower policy concept, 
“governance” reflects the fact that technological 
development and other economic processes are multi-
actor processes, and socio-technical change is fuelled 
by millions of decisions of different actors. This is 
significant for several reasons. First, different actors 
are usually driven by different goals, interests and 
ambitions. Second, it is not at all certain that the state or 
the European Union is or should be the central actor in 
steering these processes. 
Although two policy areas in particular are usually 
mentioned in the context of the eco-efficient economy 
agenda – environmental policy and innovation policy – 
a much greater variety of governance approaches affect, 
and may be used to promote, the eco-efficient economy. 
As Chapter 3 showed, the important question is not 
which governance measure to use – as most sectors 
today are in fact subject to a combination of governance 
measures. The choice of instrument is a complex 
task, and the topic of a whole academic literature. 
Key considerations to make relate to the problem 
characteristics, such as how dangerous it is, what are 
the possibilities and costs of mitigation, and available 
substitutes. Furthermore, different issues and sectors 
lend themselves to different levels of governance, 
from the EU through national-level policy down to 
local and regional levels. The relevant question is how 
to effectively apply well-balanced combinations of 
different governance measures. Finding these effective 
combinations is an immensely complex task, but also 
one that can draw on experiences and knowledge about 
policy practice in a wide variety of fields and sectors. 
This chapter places a selection of existing European 
policies – energy and climate, efficiency, sustainable 
production and consumption, innovation, and external 
policies – within a broader governance framework. It 
first introduces three principal approaches: regulatory 
standard-setting; market-based measures; and voluntary, 
collaborative and information-based approaches. These 
co-exist in various existing EU policy areas, which are 
surveyed in the second part of the chapter. Drawing on 
the sector examples of the previous chapter, the status 
of policies is presented and options for moving toward a 
more eco-efficient economy agenda are considered. 
PRInCIPAl PolICy APPRoAChES
Regulatory standard-setting
Regulatory standard-setting is the traditional approach 
of states for addressing environmental problems. It 
dominated environmental governance in the 1970’s 
and 1980’s. Typical examples include environmental 
product standards, technology specifications, standards 
on production processes, permitting procedures, and 
bans of certain products and activities. Standards and 
technological prescriptions have in many cases been 
effective in reducing emissions of certain pollutants 
as an “absolute” pressure for firms to consider 
environmental issues.124 However, these instruments 
have been criticised for being inflexible and for focusing 
on achieving only a minimum level of environmental 
protection rather than promoting new technology 
development. A main argument against, is that it can lead 
to high costs for firms and thus decrease competitiveness. 
There is a fear that regulations may bring too hard a 
pressure on firms that will cause them to move their 
production to other countries. At the same time, well-
124 Rugman, A. and A. Verbeke (1998). “Corporate strate-
gies and environmental regulations: an organizing frame-
work.” Strategic Management Journal 19: 363-375.
4  GovernanCe For a euroPean eCo-eFFiCient eConomy – 
Current status
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designed environmental regulations may stimulate 
new technologies adapted to the new environmental 
regulations and give the home-based firms a first-mover 
advantage.125 However, this implies that regulators are 
able to foresee international regulation trends as well 
as reaction patterns of companies. In addition, it may 
require a home market of a certain volume. 
Whether to regulate products or processes is a critical 
thread of discussion.126 Production processes normally 
affect production within the home country or region, 
and product standards may influence both domestic 
and foreign production. Past experiences show that 
when environmental regulations concern production 
processes, it often leads first to the adoption of end-of-
pipe, add-on technologies. Only once it appears that 
the environmental regulations will remain and even 
become more stringent will firms start to engage in new 
and integrated technology development. Thus, after a 
first phase of retrofitting, firms may start searching for 
technology designs that capture energy and emissions 
concerns. As shown in the automotive and chemicals 
examples in Chapter 3, there are situations where 
regulatory standard-setting has played a major role in 
promoting technological change. Furthermore, we are 
now witnessing a renewed interest in standard-setting, 
in for instance energy-efficiency in domestic appliances 
and housing, and automotive fuel-efficiency.  
market-based approaches
Market-based measures harness market forces to 
steer actors towards certain behaviours. Economic 
instruments include, for example, emissions trading, 
environmental taxes and charges, deposit-refund 
systems, subsidies, green purchasing, and liability and 
compensation. Market-based measures may involve 
the adjustment of an existing large-scale market, for 
instance through environmental taxation to correct for 
externalities. They may also deal with the deregulation 
of a regulated market that is opening up to competition, 
which might induce innovation. Finally, they may add 
particular rules to extend an existing niche market, for 
instance creating a rule about the supply of ethanol or 
125 Porter, M. and C. Van der Linde (1995). “Green and 
Competitive: Ending the Stalemate.” Harvard Business 
Review (Sept-Oct): 120-134.
126 Scharpf, F. (1997). “Introduction: the problemsolving 
capacity of multi-level governance.” Journal of European 
Public Policy 4: 520-538.
establishing a secure price for investors in renewable 
energy. 
The EU generally considers market-based instruments 
to be an efficient way to internalise the costs of pollution 
created by economic activity, resulting in prices that 
better reflect the total environmental and economic costs 
occurring during production and consumption. At the 
same time, market-based approaches create incentives 
for companies to switch from polluting technologies 
to more environmentally-friendly ones and may 
generate revenues that can be used for environmental 
improvement.  Compared to regulation, market-based 
measures are regarded as more flexible – rather than 
prescribing a certain technology, they leave room 
for the development of new technological solutions. 
However, market-based measures can also be steered 
towards particular technologies, in which case they do 
not only function as a way to correct markets but also 
communicate normatively the intentions and objectives 
of the state.
The use of market-based instruments, in particular 
taxes, charges and tradable permits, has increased in the 
EU since the mid 1990’s. Taxes have been introduced 
for CO2, sulphur fuels, waste disposal and on raw 
materials at national levels. At the EU level, emissions’ 
trading has been successfully introduced for greenhouse 
gases – apparently easier to digest for Member State 
governments than EU-wide taxation. owever, designing 
such economic incentives for high-risk pollutants and 
for non-point source pollutants can be administratively 
difficult, slow and costly.127 Trading emissions under 
a quota obligation is potentially a powerful tool to 
achieve environmental objectives in a cost-effective 
way. However, for this to happen, instrument design and 
implementation protocols are crucial. Taxes as well as 
trading under quotas work when levels are high enough 
to stimulate mitigation measures. Tax differentiation for 
low sulphur and unleaded fuels have been effective in 
changing producer and consumer behaviour towards 
innovation and purchasing decisions that reduce air 
127 Khanna, M. (2001). “Non-mandatory approaches to 
environmental protection.” Journal of Economic Surveys 
15(3): 291-324.
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pollution.128 Environmental subsidies have also proven 
effective for supporting new, cleaner technologies. 
voluntary, collaborative and information-
based approaches
The third category of governance approaches comprises 
a range of measures that are voluntary and cooperative 
in nature, such as information provision, network 
creation and match-making, management and auditing 
systems, labelling and R&D support. Some of these 
are often also referred to as “self-regulation”, in which 
case standard-setting may well figure prominently, but 
their development is delegated to private actors such 
as industry associations. Thus, discretion may be high. 
The incentives for the firms to participate may be to 
pre-empt the threat of mandatory regulations, to shape 
future regulations, to achieve technical assistance and/or 
financial subsidies, improved relations with government 
and stakeholders, and cost efficiency. Programmes 
frequently work under “a shadow of regulation” such 
as programs that ask firms to voluntarily improve their 
environmental performance in exchange for benefits 
such as regulatory relief (see the energy efficiency 
example). These approaches have become more 
popular due to their supposed ability to engage industry 
in a learning process that will enable them to change 
their business orientation to more environmentally 
responsible activities and techniques at the same time 
as costs are kept low, potentially providing domestic 
firms with first-mover advantage in the shift towards 
environmentally friendly techniques.129 Environmental 
NGOs have often pioneered in these types of 
approaches, working through governance arrangements 
in partnership with industry to develop eco-labelling 
and various types of standards.
Public voluntary programs are established by 
environmental agencies to invite firms to voluntarily 
meet specific standards. Firms show that they 
participate by signing non-binding letters of agreements 
128 EEA (2006). Using the market for cost-effective envi-
ronmental policy. Market-based instruments in Europe. 
Copenhagen, European Environment Agency.
129 De Bruijn, T. and V. Norberg-Bohm (2005). Innova-
tions in the Environmental Policy System: Voluntary, Col-
laborative and Information-based Policies in the United 
States and the Netherlands. Towards Environmental 
Innovation Systems. K. M. Weber and J. Hemmelskamp. 
Heidelberg, Springer: 269-281.
and their progress is monitored through self-reporting. 
Negotiated agreements between a firm and the regulator 
involve active negotiation between the government 
and the firm on abatement targets and plans. 
Unilateral initiatives occur without direct government 
involvement. Firms may develop their own plans or 
management systems to improve their environmental 
performance, they can participate in codes of conduct 
or guidelines developed by trade associations, and 
they can meet the environmental performance for 
registering with a certifying organization. In addition 
to these categories of voluntary initiatives, government 
and non-government agencies may provide information 
about firms’ environmental performance, which in 
turn may lead to firms voluntarily taking initiatives to 
improve their performance. Examples of these include 
environmental labelling of products and “black-lists” 
of firms having poor environmental standards. At the 
European level, there has been an increased interest in 
the setting of non-binding benchmarking and evaluation 
of information as a policy instrument, called the “Open 
Method of Coordination”.
CuRREnt EuRoPEAn PolICIES130
The governance approaches outlined above are 
evidenced in different combinations and to varying 
degrees on the current European policy landscape. What 
follows is a short summary of the current state of the EU 
policy areas most relevant to promoting an eco-efficient 
economy, with brief analyses of future policy options. 
Like in Chapter 3, the account is not comprehensive, 
but probes into some of the most relevant policy areas. 
In addition, policies such as regional development 
policy, tourism policy, R&D policy, agricultural policy 
and enterprise policy would have strong significance in 
governing towards a European eco-efficient economy.
Eu’s energy and climate policy
Europe’s energy policy is based on the three core 
objectives of sustainability, competitiveness and 
security of supply. Within this context, in December 
2008 the European Parliament and Council agreed 
on a new climate and energy package to guide policy 
through 2020. It includes a directive on the promotion 
130 The interested reader will find more details on the Euro-
pean Union’s webpages which provides useful summary 
accounts of all policy areas; see http://europa.eu/pol/
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of renewable sources of energy (including national 
binding targets with burden sharing between Member 
States and sustainability criteria for biofuels), a new 
directive for the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) 
to extend the existing scheme, and a proposal for efforts 
to reduce emissions from sectors that are not in ETS, 
such as transports, buildings, services, smaller industrial 
installations, agriculture and waste. Further agreements 
included a new regulation setting emission performance 
standards for new passenger cars registered in the EU 
at an average target of 130g CO2/km, a revised fuel 
quality directive, requiring fuel suppliers to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. An additional directive was 
approved in December 2008 on the legal framework for 
the carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology as a 
future means for industrial installations to “decrease” 
CO2 emissions. 
The EU ETS is one of the most important means of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the EU region. 
This cap-and-trade system, designed to facilitate 
emissions reductions at the lowest possible cost, is 
the largest multi-country, multi-sector greenhouse gas 
emission trading scheme world-wide. The EU ETS 
became operational in 2005 and covers over 10,000 
installations in industrial sectors including the energy 
production, iron & steel, mineral, and pulp & paper. 
These installations are collectively responsible for half 
of the EU’s CO2 emissions and 40 per cent of its total 
greenhouse gas emissions. According to the climate 
and energy package, fewer emission allowances will 
be granted, with the aim to reduce the emissions from 
the installations included in the scheme to 21 per cent 
below 2005 levels by 2020. For the sectors not included 
in the EU ETS, such as road and sea transport, buildings, 
services, agriculture, waste and smaller industrial 
installations, emissions should be cut by 10 per cent 
below the levels in 2005 from 2013 and 2020, through 
binding national targets. 
The EU ETS sits within a broader set of EU-level 
policies to address climate change and climate change 
policy. The January 2009 Communication from the 
European Commission constitutes a proposal to achieve 
global agreement at the December 2009 climate change 
negotiations in Copenhagen.131 The Communication 
131 CEC (2009b). Communication: Towards a comprehen-
sive climate change agreement in Copenhagen. Brussels, 
European Commission.
identifies the key challenges to be: targets by developed 
countries and appropriate actions by developing 
countries; the need to address the financing of actions 
by developing countries (to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions and adapt to climate change); and the need to 
build an effective global carbon market. Furthermore, 
in March 2009, the Council (Environment) adopted 
conclusions on Further development of the EU position 
on a comprehensive post-2012 climate agreement.132
The European climate and energy policy as described 
above has employed both standard-setting and market-
based governance mechanisms to achieve policy goals. 
These governance approaches will remain germane 
in the future, as the current plan to achieve a 20 per 
cent renewable energy mix by 2020 is to be reached 
through a new directive mandating national targets on 
renewable energy in the electricity, heating and cooling, 
and transport sectors. 
In moving toward a more eco-efficient energy sector, 
the internal energy market can be seen as a strategic 
instrument, providing consumers with choices of 
different suppliers of energy and of making a major 
domestic market accessible for all suppliers. Other 
governance to encourage renewable energy use can 
include removing barriers, measures to promote 
renewable energies such as public procurement and 
support systems, cooperation with stakeholders in the 
renewable energy sector, encouraging optimal use of 
existing financial instruments, and ensuring continued 
exchange of best practice. In addition, investments in 
research and development projects in the field of low 
carbon-output fossil fuel technologies, such as CCS 
must be carried out. There may also be a need for 
considering the continued use of nuclear energy. Plans to 
reach the climate targets do not only concern the internal 
market and activities in the EU, but rather international 
agreements are important and must lead to concrete 
commitments. The EU aims to be a driving force in 
the development of international energy agreements, 
as described under external policy below, and a further 
promotion of an expansion of the ETS internationally is 
132 Council of the European Union (2009). Contribution 
of the Council (Environment) to the Spring European 
Council (19 and 20 March 2009): Further development 
of the EU position on a comprehensive post-2012 climate 
agreement. . Brussels, European Commission.
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needed so as to ensure an effective pricing mechanism 
for greenhouse gases internationally.
Eu’s energy efficiency policy
As discussed in Chapter 3, energy efficiency is gaining 
plenty of interest anew. Since 2002, the EU has 
introduced a series of initiatives to promote energy 
efficiency, targeting buildings, combined heat and energy 
generation, transport, end-use efficiency, and employing 
labelling and taxation techniques, among others.  The 
2002 Energy Performance of Buildings Directive 
includes a common methodology for calculating the 
energy performance of buildings, minimum standards 
for energy performance of new and renovated buildings, 
energy performance certificates and regular inspections 
of boilers, ventilation and air conditioning systems. In 
2008, a more ambitious and innovative recast Directive 
was introduced for the Energy Performance of Buildings 
Directive, aimed at improving the energy efficiency of 
houses, the construction industry, and building better 
quality buildings. In 2005, the Eco-design Directive was 
introduced to increase energy savings from domestic 
appliances, followed by the Directive on energy end-
use efficiency and energy services.133 This Directive 
requires EU Member States to adopt energy saving 
targets of 9 per cent by 2015, mandates the public 
sector to adopt measures to improve energy efficiency, 
and promotes exchanges of good practices by engaging 
the business sector. Energy savings are to be achieved 
through financial instruments for energy savings, and 
purchasing energy efficient equipment, vehicles, and 
low-energy products. On the supply side, Member States 
must ensure that energy distributors engage in energy 
efficiency activities and that they advise customers of 
efficiency options. 
Realising that these initiatives were insufficient to 
achieve concerns such as climate change and foreign 
energy dependency, the European Commission 
introduced a Green Paper on Energy Efficiency. This 
emphasised achieving energy savings through better 
enforcement of existing legislation. Furthermore, an 
Action Plan for Energy Efficiency was presented in 2006. 
The Plan describes areas where energy savings can be 
made, including the residential and commercial building 
sectors, the manufacturing sector and the transport 
133 CEC (2006b). Directive 2006/32/EC of 5 April 2006 on 
energy end-use efficiency and energy services. Brussels, 
European Commission.
sector along with a number of actions which could lead 
to these energy savings.134 Efforts have also reached 
beyond the EU. The Strategic Energy Technology Plan 
(SET) aims to develop and deploy low-cost, low carbon 
technologies. This includes planning, implementing and 
coordinating resources and international cooperation in 
the area of energy technology.
Between now and 2020, the Action Plan for Energy 
Efficiency proposes sweeping change, including a 
harmonised tax regime to reduce CO2 emissions from 
cars, urban transport improvement, and inclusion of 
aviation in the EU ETS. From a governance perspective, 
it embraces voluntary and information-based approaches 
to governance as well as market-based mechanisms, 
relying in part on the mobilisation of European citizens 
and market actors. An aspect of the Plan to be pursued in 
policy is engagement of the banking sector in promoting 
energy efficiency, by offering banking opportunities for 
businesses that provide energy efficiency solutions, and 
plans to remove national legal barriers to shared savings, 
third-party financing, energy performance contracting 
and recourse to businesses providing energy services. 
Eu’s sustainable consumption/production 
policies
The transboundary nature of global production and 
consumption makes a country- or EU-level analysis 
of production and consumption policy challenging. 
Broadly, EU policy in this field is built on a eclectic 
foundation of interlinked policies including: the 
Integrated Product Policy (IPP); the thematic strategy 
on the sustainable use of natural resources; the thematic 
strategy on waste prevention and recycling; eco-
management and audit scheme (EMAS); eco-label 
scheme; the environmental technologies action plan 
(ETAP); Green public procurement (GPP); eco-design 
of energy using products directive (EuP); and the 
European Compliance Assistance Programme.135
The foundations are synthesized in the Sustainable 
Consumption and Production and Sustainable 
Industrial Policy Action Plan proposed in 2008. The 
IPP emphasises a life cycle perspective of consumption 
and production, calling for all parts of a products’ life 
134 CEC (2006a). COM(2006)545 final. Action Plan for 
Energy Efficiency: Realising the Potential. Brussels, 
European Commission.
135 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/escp_en.htm
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cycle to be taken into account when the products are 
designed, and creating incentives for consumers to buy 
eco-designed products. The external costs caused by 
the products’ and production methods’ impacts on the 
environment are to be internalised and reflected in the 
price of the product. This is suggested to be achieved 
for example by differential taxation or incentives. To 
this end, a number of EU Member States are already 
providing incentives for development and acquiring 
of energy and environmental performing products. 
However, the criteria that these products have to meet 
can differ substantially from one country to another. 
In order to overcome this fragmentation, the Action 
Plan SCP/SIP proposes to set a harmonised basis for 
incentives provided by the EU and its Member States. 
The Thematic Strategy on the prevention and recycling 
of waste addresses ways in which waste policies can 
efficiently reduce the negative environmental impacts 
of resources use, through preventing, recycling 
and recovering wastes. The European Compliance 
Assistance Programme provides a set of measures to 
help small and medium enterprise (SME) minimise 
the environmental impact of their activities. The 
programme will design instruments and policies to 
integrate environmental concerns into the core of SME 
activities.
The relatively new Sustainable Consumption and 
Production and Sustainable Industrial Policy Action 
Plan lays out a framework for improving the energy and 
environmental performance of products and promote 
environmentally conscious consumer choices.136 It 
recognises that the voluntary and regulatory instruments 
of earlier policies are insufficient to exploit potential 
synergies. The Action Plan suggests extending the 
ambition of various existing policies: the Directive on 
the Eco-design of Energy Using Products should cover 
all energy-related products; and the Energy Labelling 
Directive should be extended to cover a wider range of 
products. 
The goals in this policy area are to maximise the business 
potential to transform environmental challenges 
into economic opportunities, to provide better deals 
for consumers, to foster resource efficient and eco-
friendly products and to raise consumer awareness. To 
136 CEC (2008g). Sustainable Consumption and Production 
and Sustainable Industrial Policy Action Plan  Com 2008 
(397). Brussels, European Commission.
achieve this objective the 2008 Action Plan balances 
voluntary measures, soft regulation and incentive-
based approaches, which appears necessary in a field so 
inherently complex in terms of issues and monitoring 
requirements. The fact that increased carbon efficiency 
in industrial sectors – such as chemicals and steel as 
examined in Chapter 3 – is counteracted by a steady 
increase in consumption causes a particular future 
policy challenge. This is compounded by the fact that 
an increasing proportion of the products purchased in 
the EU have been produced in other parts of the world, 
making it difficult to monitor – and therefore regulate 
– greenhouse gas emissions. Some of the emission 
reductions noted in European industries may be due to 
the fact that much industrial production has been moved 
elsewhere. 
The underlying challenge is to decouple environmental 
degradation from economic growth. Improvement is 
needed for the overall environmental performance of 
products through their life cycle, and more eco-efficient 
products and production technologies are needed. 
Future policies will need to stimulate low carbon and 
resource-efficient technologies, products and services; 
stimulate the development of new, environmentally 
friendly products; stimulate cleaner production methods, 
promote more conscious purchasing decisions and not 
least help shape the international norms and standards 
to ensure a level playing field and more eco-efficient 
consumption and production world-wide.137 
Eu’s innovation policies
The EU’s innovation strategy provides priority actions 
for innovation governance at national and European 
levels.138 It aims in particular to promote innovation-
driven lead market initiatives, which facilitate the 
emergence and marketing of innovative products and 
services. These are areas where removing barriers 
would contribute to competitiveness and new market 
emergence. Of relevance to the eco-efficient economy 
agenda, eco-innovation, transport, and eco-construction 
are among the potential prospects for such lead markets 
(see also Chapter 2). 
137 Background document to the consultation on the action 
plans on sustainable consumption and production and 
sustainable industrial policy. 
138 CEC (2006e). Putting knowledge into practice: A 
broad-based innovation strategy for the EU (COM(2006) 
502. Brussels, European Commission.
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On a separate agenda, the EU Competitiveness and 
Innovation Framework Programme (CIP), running from 
2007-2013, promotes the competitiveness of European 
enterprises – particularly small and medium sized ones 
(SMEs). It further aims to promote innovation including 
eco-innovations, the development of the information 
society, and energy efficiency and the increased use of 
renewable energy sources in many sectors, including 
transport. The CIP is divided into three operational 
programmes: Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
Programme (EIP) aims to promote access to finance 
for start-up and growth of SMEs as well as to promote 
SME cooperation. The Information Communication 
Technologies Policy Support Programme (ICT 
PSP) aims to strengthen the internal market for ICT 
products and services, stimulating innovation through 
the adoption of and investment in ICT, developing 
an inclusive information society and more efficient 
and effective services in areas of public interest. And 
the Intelligent Energy Europe Programme (IEE) 
contributes to securing sustainable energy for Europe, 
while enhancing European competitiveness. Finally, the 
Environmental Technologies Action Plan (ETAP – see 
also sustainable consumption and production policies 
above)139 was adopted in 2004 to boost the development 
of environmental technologies and to improve the 
competitiveness of the EU region in environmental 
technologies. Covering activities from promoting eco 
innovation to the use of environmental technologies, its 
objective is to improve European competitiveness.
As argued in Chapter 1 and 2, innovation governance 
is intimately connected to the eco-efficient economy, 
innovation being the all-embraced solution to the 
industrial competitiveness and environmental protection 
dilemma. It has traditionally relied on voluntary 
mechanisms, innovation being conceptually difficult 
to regulate. However, we now see how the issue of 
innovation perhaps more than any other highlights the 
importance of policy integration – in how it is necessary 
to understand how incentives and regulation in other 
policy areas are needed, which indirectly create market-
based or other incentives to drive innovation. At the 
European level, ETAP might be seen as an example 
of policy integration in practice. Its implementation is 
139 CEC (2004a). COM(2004) 38 final. Stimulating Tech-
nologies for Sustainable Development: An Environmental 
Technologies Action Plan for the European UnioUnion. 
Brussels, European Commission.
facilitated by a High Level Working Group comprised of 
representatives from EU Member States and European 
Commission services. Open co-ordination with the 
Member States helps advance ETAP by exchanging 
ideas, developing indicators and setting guidelines and 
timetables. Stakeholder consultation is also built into 
the ETAP process.
Eu’s external policies: trade and “green 
diplomacy”
As seen above in the context of energy and climate 
policy, as well as the case studies on biofuels, chemicals 
and the steel industry, Europe’s policy-making for an 
eco-efficient economy must extend beyond Europe. 
The developed countries have historically contributed 
most to the global greenhouse gas emissions – but as 
developing countries expand their economies, their 
emissions are increasing as well. By 2020, emissions 
from developing countries are expected to out-grow 
those of the developed world.140 In order to achieve 
emission reductions in these countries as well, creative 
and diplomatic approaches will be needed. In 2002, 
an initiative was launched to promote the integration 
of environmental issues into external relations. The 
result, the Green Diplomacy Network, comprises an 
informal network of environment experts within foreign 
ministries and focuses on environmental topics of 
relevance to the EU’s external relations – such as climate 
change, renewable energy, and trade and environment, 
among others. The network is a potentially important 
consortium for the advancement of the European eco-
efficient economy agenda. 
Both adequate internal policies reflecting the external 
competitive challenge, and ensuring openness and 
fair rules in other markets are critical for European 
competitiveness.141 Crucial to creating globally 
competitive companies in the EU was the creation of 
the internal market, and further steps have been taken 
to strengthen the EU’s competitiveness by means of 
strengthening the EU market, including the launch of 
the euro currency. The EU supports strong multilateral 
trading systems, the WTO and its agreements, and has 
140 CEC (2007d). Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 
degrees Celsius - The way ahead for 2020 and beyond 
[COM(2007) 2 final]. Brussels, European Commission.
141 CEC (2006d). Global Europe competing in the world. 
A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy. 
Brussels, European Commission.
a european eco-efficient economy
42
also launched bilateral trade agreements with India, 
South Korea and the South East Asian countries among 
others. EU trade policy is also used currently to support 
an eco-efficient economy. For instance, developing 
countries that have ratified and implemented global 
environmental agreements can receive tariff rate cuts 
when exporting to the EU. The EU also supported an 
Environmental Goods and Services Agreement as part 
of the Doha WTO trade negotiations. Thus, the EU is 
not only proactive in finding climate change solutions 
internally, but is also active in the international arena. 
The EU heads of state and government have made a 
commitment to cut the EU greenhouse gas emissions to 
30 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020, if other developed 
countries also commit to comparable reductions. 
Countries that reach a certain level of development 
must make appropriate commitments. Recognizing a 
responsibility to support mitigation efforts of developing 
countries while also helping climate change adaptation, 
the Commission has proposed a Global Climate 
Change Alliance (GCCA) between the EU and the most 
vulnerable developing countries, in order to integrate 
climate change into poverty reduction strategies. The 
GCCA provides resources for adaptation and disaster 
risk reduction, works to minimise deforestation in these 
countries, and assists with participation in the global 
carbon market. Where the GCCA focuses on the most 
vulnerable developing countries, a wide range of bi- 
and multilateral EU cooperation initiatives also exist. 
These include projects with high-emitting countries 
such as India and China – respectively, the EU-India 
Clean Development and Climate Change Initiative, and 
the EU-China Partnership on Climate Change. Thus, 
although policy integration is normally not discussed in 
the field of international cooperation, the pursuit of the 
eco-efficient economy very much depends on it; a point 
to which we will return in the following chapters.
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In the introduction to this report, we outlined four key themes that encapsulate the eco-efficient economy: 
synergy between economic growth and environmental 
protection; integration of policies, use of new policy 
instruments and governance arrangements, and new 
activities of invention, innovation and diffusion in the 
economy. The examples provided in Chapters 3 and 
4 demonstrate that all these themes are more or less 
present across sectors, and that Europe in many ways 
is on track towards an eco-efficient economy. However, 
the journey has barely begun, and as the “low-hanging 
fruit” starts to run out, the continued pursuit is likely 
to entail many more challenges and the need for more 
active public intervention. What can be learned from 
recent sector and governance developments that may 
help set the agenda for governing towards a European 
eco-efficient economy?
First, much has been achieved across all sectors 
examined, and much is in the pipe-line right now. 
Catching the “low-hanging fruit” that is so central, 
i.e. where enhanced competitiveness through reduced 
costs or enhanced market positioning go directly 
hand in hand with better environmental performance, 
have in retrospect been quite successful despite many 
industries’ fears of higher costs and competitiveness 
losses. At a general level, resource productivity and 
energy efficiency are improving, the transition from 
fossil to renewable energy supplies is on-going, and 
Europe is improving its innovation systems. Europe has 
made tough commitments for climate and energy and 
evidence of better policy coordination is emerging at 
the European level. Still there are untapped potentials 
across different sectors, and there is a clear role for 
enhanced European governance to help economic actors 
capturing these potentials, as well as strengthening 
common European visions such as the “202020” goals 
across Member States. Although the economic crisis 
undoubtedly shifts the focus to near term concerns in 
EU politics, public interventions for economic recovery 
also constitute an opportunity.
Second, Europe can be attractive for investment. In the 
global context, European governance signals institutional 
safety and stable markets. While some industries have 
raised concerns that excessive regulation or high labour 
or environmental costs may affect competitiveness and 
cause “leakage”, there is evidence that these costs have 
tended to be exaggerated.142 Economic research has also 
shown that long-term competitiveness is more about 
innovation capacity than input costs. Examples such 
as the automotive and the chemical industry support 
this argument. Indeed, business leaders today tend to 
agree that “Competitiveness is not about labour cost 
– it is about availability and support in innovation; 
innovation capacity”.143 Such capacity has to do with 
infrastructure, universities, and the supply of the right 
competence. Furthermore, regardless of factor costs, 
Europe will always be a very considerable domestic 
market with strong consumer power – a market which 
companies like to consider a domestic one, for logistical 
reasons but also to understand the demand of consumers. 
In addition, the overall European brand of a socially 
“tempered” market economy, a good environment 
and strong welfare system are increasingly attracting 
highly educated and skilled experts that provide the 
essential competitive advantage for knowledge-based 
growth. In this context, European governance for the 
eco-efficient economy can set the direction, provide the 
fuel, and supply the talent, and thus provide a potential 
lever to enhance innovation capacities and long-term 
competitiveness, making Europe even more attractive 
for dynamic industries. 
Third, Europe needs to enhance and adapt its 
innovation governance. Innovation is crucial for 
the future of Europe and the competitiveness of the 
countries in the EU region, as well as for developing 
the new eco-efficient technologies. Europe has lagged 
behind in terms of innovation performance, compared 
to for instance US and Japan, but is today catching 
up. One issue concerns the conditions and potential 
for SME’s to operate profitable, stable businesses and 
grow organically. To this end, alleviating administrative 
burden, enhancing labour market flexibility and 
improving access to capital are all issues that are 
already high on the EU policy makers’ agenda. 
The other fundamental issue is the governance of 
142 Stockholm Environment Institute (1999). Costs and 
strategies presented by industry during the negotiations 
of environmental regulations. Stockholm, SEI.
143 Gerard Ruizendaal, Chief Strategy Officer of Philips, 
speech at Conference on Industrial Competitiveness, DG 
Enterprise, Brussels, 17 March 2009
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innovation. That early-stage technologies may need 
to be subject to technology-specific support schemes 
although this to some extent is countering the liberal 
logic that underpins the European single market. In the 
first phases of innovation and product development, a 
dynamic innovation framework needs to put emphasis on 
experimentation and learning. Here, R&D investments, 
technology partnerships and technology-specific niche-
market measures can have an important role to play. For 
example, in the case of renewable electricity promotion, 
fixing prices appears to be an important strategy for very 
early-stage technologies. In the more mature technology 
phase, governance based on broader market-efficiency 
appears appropriate. (See Figure 18) Here, certificate 
markets currently used to promote renewable energy 
play an important interim role. Under these schemes, 
different technologies will have to compete on equal 
market conditions, market transactions still account 
for external costs. It is also of importance to see the 
differences in international competition, the type of 
technology and the type of environmental problem in 
different sectors, in order to create incentive structures 
that fit the specific sector. 
Fourth, mature industrial sector are integral to the 
eco-efficient economy agenda. This agenda have often 
been mixed up with the “green-tech” agenda and the 
quest to promote the emergence of new industries. 
However, the economic weight of mature industries such 
as chemicals, cars and iron & steel, and their responses 
to eco-efficiency challenges show that their innovation 
and adaptation to environmental issues and global 
competition are critical. In this context, the potential for 
efficiency enhancement needs to be fully captured, and 
further governance measures to facilitate this should be 
Figure 18: adapting governance to 
systems“maturity”     
(Source: adapted from Midttun and Gautesen, 2007)
discussed. This industrial base is in constant change, 
but there is no doubt that these industries are needed 
in Europe: we cannot solve environmental and socio-
economic challenges without their resources and value 
added. Furthermore, large incumbent EU industries are 
the main customers of hundreds of thousands of SMEs 
around Europe. Strengthening the SME sector and the 
growth of new firms, as already alluded to, is therefore 
closely linked to the capacities of the larger companies. 
The role of European governance should be to establish 
the best possible framework conditions and direction 
for this to occur along eco-efficient economy paths. 
Importantly, sectors dominated by mature technologies 
need different types of governance responses than new 
and emerging sectors (See Figure 18). However, not 
only maturity but also the level of globalisation in the 
specific sector has implications for how the sector is best 
governed. Tough policies such as ETS are warranted 
but needs to be coupled with adjacent measures to for 
instance assist basic materials industries to move up 
the value chain into more technologically advanced 
products.
Fifth, governance “packages” are effective and 
politically viable. No single support measure is 
universally “the best”. Different cases highlight the 
power and potential of many different governance 
approaches. For instance, the district heating case 
shows the power of a tax and the need to advance this 
at national levels, in particular for non-ETS sectors. 
Several examples, including chemicals, cars, and energy 
efficiency, shows the important role of regulatory 
standard-setting as part of a broader package for driving 
industrial change (cf REACH and the Green Package). 
To induce investor confidence, the packages must be 
seen as stable and stay in place for a relatively long 
time period (at least a decade). Under these conditions, 
combinations of instruments may become much more 
than the sum of the individual parts. For instance, the 
combination of using voluntary action combined with 
(threats of) regulatory pressure has proven effective. 
In addition, such policy packages are well attuned to 
political processes of bargaining and deal-making. At 
the same time, excessive government intervention is 
also associated with problems. OECD has pointed out 
that due to the economic crisis we are now witnessing a 
return to massive government interventions across many 
sectors, and they caution that we know far too little 
about what will be the long term implications, and that 
Maturity
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Access policy
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governments need credible exit strategies.144 There are 
also inherent limitations to public policy interventions – 
many of the problems and opportunities in the examined 
sectors are determined by externally shaped market 
developments and consumer preferences.
Sixth, the eco-efficient economy is a global agenda, 
rather than a European one. The EU can play a true 
leadership role as best practitioner and standard setter 
being the largest integrated market worldwide. Still, 
industries, resources, and environmental impacts all 
diffuse across borders. Problems like carbon leakage 
or capital flight become real without global framework 
rules. And as Europe only represents a fraction of 
global pressures on resources and the climate, the scale 
of intervention towards the eco-efficient economy 
must ultimately be global. This adds an international 
dimension to policy integration (see Figure 19). 
Therefore, Europe’s international policies, including 
environmental diplomacy, neighbourhood policies, 
coping with enlargement, and advancing the broader 
international policy agenda (including aid and trade 
policies) must interact more closely. The development 
of “packages” as discussed above should be further 
explored also at the international level. Importantly, the 
international agenda needs not be a defensive one: the 
chemicals case displays a more positive international 
aspect in the governance for an eco-efficient economy 
– regulatory overspill. It shows that the industry’s 
competition fears due to strict regulation also have a 
flip side; that industries in other countries must oblige 
with regulation or that their country governments 
will eventually replicate policies – leading then to a 
potential competitive advantage for the “early movers” 
in the EU. 
Seventh, the eco-efficient economy requires systems 
thinking. It is linked to global resource flows, and 
appropriate governance measures rely on balanced 
considerations on climate change and other critical 
sustainability aspects such as ecosystems management, 
land conservation and food production in relation 
to growth, jobs and welfare. In many cases, such as 
biofuels and sustainable cities, regulators and planners 
lack the necessary systems of knowledge to understand 
the direct and indirect effects of different courses 
144 Pier Carlo Padoan, Deputy Secretary General of OECD, 
speech at Brussels conference on industrial competitive-
ness on 17th March, 2009.
Figure 19: time and scale in pursuing the eco-
efficient economy
of action. Therefore, better systems for knowledge 
support, for instance through the frameworks of 
impact assessment (IA) and strategic environmental 
assessment (SEA) are needed to capture at least some 
of the complex chains of cause and effect around the 
world. Systems thinking entails being mindful of goal 
conflicts and dilemmas while capitalising on synergies 
and opportunities. Dilemmas are of course present in the 
“traditional” sectors such as iron & steel or chemicals, 
where there is a risk for carbon leakage, but they also 
emerge in supposedly more benign cases. Biofuels 
have large environmental and economic potential, but 
also encapsulates the central dilemma: to uphold the 
precautionary principle to protect natural environments 
versus allowing new and carbon-neutral technological 
innovation systems to prosper under safeguard policies.
Eighth, the eco-efficient economy depends on 
policy integration. As regards vertical integration, 
historical experiences show that many pieces of the 
eco-efficient economy governance may better be 
left to levels and actors below the European Union. 
Energy and automotive industries are two important 
sectors that have made significant progress through 
national governance. Recalling the range of governance 
instruments described earlier, the feasibility of these at 
the European level varies. For instance, when it comes 
to taxation or large investment projects, the European 
Union has limited competency today. Therefore, 
vertical coordination is of critical importance. It is 
necessary to engage and encourage Member States to 
more strongly articulate European perspectives on the 
eco-efficient economy. The EU needs to actively pursue 
a joint vision about what this means, in both its internal 
and external policies. As regards horizontal integration, 
the effectiveness of European governance depends on 
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how well it is being tuned to the social, institutional and 
technological characteristics of the economic sectors 
in which they are being pursued, and this often means 
transgressing the conventional boundaries of policy 
making. The most glaring example in this study is 
the biofuels issue, which touches upon, for instance, 
agriculture, forestry, automotive, R&D, and energy 
policies as well as various aspects of international 
relations such as trade and climate negotiations.
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Europe has in many ways been a leader globally for the eco-efficient economy in general and 
climate change mitigation in particular. Like no other 
jurisdiction, it has made hard commitments and binding 
resolutions on how to meet them. But now, when the 
new US administration and China (sometimes referred 
to as “G2”) are beginning to set more of the agenda 
for global climate discussions, Europe must enhance its 
efforts to maintain a front-line position. To date, much 
of the European leadership has been developed “top-
down” by way of political commitments and imposed 
targets. To stay at the front-line it must now also show 
leadership “bottom-up”, by way of exploring and 
exploiting the industrial and economic potential for eco-
efficient economic growth – in both manufacturing and 
services. Many of the sectors represented in this study 
constitute core elements of the eco-efficient economy, 
and show potentials for job creation, exports (if future 
global markets contain carbon prices), economic 
resilience (for instance to fluctuating resource prices) 
and innovation. Realising this potential requires active 
governance. How can EU policy makers step up their 
efforts to foster a European eco-efficient economy over 
the coming years? In this final chapter, we discuss a 
set of strategic areas and policy agendas that would 
contribute to such an effort. Among the multitude of 
measures that are needed across all activities in society, 
three overarching and strategic areas can be identified 
(See Figure 20).
Resource systems efficiency•  in various forms, which 
is particularly well suited in time of crisis due 
to its very direct double benefits, such as energy 
end-use efficiency, sustainable cities including 
infrastructure and building improvements and 
transport planning, as these have a direct appeal 
in times of constrained economies. Much of these 
improvements is available already today, and can be 
identified and implemented through more systems-
oriented perspectives on policy and planning.
New technology markets• , with a focus on 
transportation and energy systems, as these sectors 
constitute the overriding contributors to climate 
change and resource degradation globally. Much 
of this concerns learning, diffusion and market 
growth of existing and pipeline technologies, such 
as carbon capture and sequestration, biomaterials, 
6  aGenda For a euroPean eCo-eFFiCient eConomy
Figure 20: three strategic areas and examples 
of priority action items
biofuels, electric vehicles, solar, wind and wave 
power.
Global carbon pricing•  to shape demand in markets 
for investment and consumption globally, as this 
is arguably the single the strongest policy action 
to yield eco-efficient growth in the long term. 
Without a global carbon pricing in some form, 
competitiveness imbalances, carbon leakage and 
political difficulties with important constituencies 
will permeate the quest for the eco-efficient 
economy. Reaching this requires ancillary measures 
such as international standards, R&D cooperation, 
financial transfers, and trade relations.
It is technically possible145 to pursue these strategies 
to achieve far-reaching greenhouse gas emission 
reductions, and recent research has also suggested that it 
makes economic sense.146 However, such achievements 
145 Recent calculations can be examined in: MacKay, D. 
(2009). Sustainable energy - without the hot air. Cam-
bridge, UK, UIT.
146 Stern, N. (2006). The Stern Review on the Economics 
of Climate Change. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press.
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are by no means automatic. To the contrary they 
require very profound policy actions and behavioural 
responses by firms and consumers. Neither the market 
nor governments will move towards an eco-efficient 
economy unless signalled to do so. For instance, energy 
efficiency and renewables currently attract only 12 
per cent of public R&D spending in the energy sector 
globally. 
Below we discuss six linked agenda items for the EU to 
initiate in political discussions at national, European and 
global levels, about how governance can be orchestrated 
to facilitate actions and responses to the eco-efficient 
economy. Based on our analysis of challenges and 
opportunities, they represent particularly important 
needs for improving current governance. We present 
them under three categories; adapting governance to 
innovation pathways; international cooperation and 
carbon pricing; and a systems approach for informed 
policy debates. 
ADAPtInG GovERnAnCE to InnovAtIon 
PAthwAyS
The appropriate governance responses at the European 
and national levels crucially depend on the technology 
being considered, its current environmental and economic 
performance, and what phase it is in. Technology-
neutrality offers a guiding principle, whereby 
governments do not try to pick the winners, but set the 
correct framework conditions for the market to develop 
and market new technologies. This requires tackling 
relevant market failures due to for example positive and 
negative externalities such as environmental impacts 
or security of supply issues, lock-in effects and entry 
barriers. However, as has been shown, new technologies 
are needed to enable far-reaching emissions reductions 
while maintaining welfare and growth. In many cases 
of early-stage innovations, technology-specific support 
measures are needed. 
1. The EU needs to step up programmed 
interventions, alongside more generic policies, to 
induce development and diffusion of eco-efficient 
technologies. Stimulating emerging technologies, 
such as hydrogen or electrified power trains, requires 
altogether different governance measures than 
supporting somewhat more mature technologies which 
may be already on the market, such as biofuels and 
hybrid vehicles (viable through adequate pricing of 
energy externalities such as carbon pricing). Crucially, 
it may not be a lack of R&D funding but rather support 
systems to move from invention to innovation – assisting 
in the journey through the “valley of death”. Here, the 
EU has so far lagged behind main competitors such as 
the US and Japan. The importance of a strong domestic 
market to nurture the growth of new industries is well 
known, and the potential of Europe becoming a lead 
market for new technologies is partly unfulfilled today. 
Furthermore, the different governance responses need 
to be sequenced as technologies mature. One example 
to learn from is the approach in renewable electricity, 
supporting early-stage technologies through fixing 
prices and guaranteeing market access, and letting more 
mature technologies compete with each other under a 
quota system or other pricing mechanism. 
2. The EU needs to develop more hybrid and 
combined governance arrangements. Considering 
the importance of the single market underpinning the 
European project overall, market enhancements and 
adjustments should remain at the core of European 
governance for an eco-efficient economy. Still, much 
more can be made of using governance approaches 
through novel combination of for instance regulatory 
standard-setting, taxes and voluntary programs. Private-
public partnerships, voluntarism under regulatory 
threats and deploying regulatory standards have proven 
to be efficient and effective complements to market-
based approaches. The automotive, renewable energy 
(Green Package) and the chemical (REACH) examples 
suggest that combined governance through “package 
solutions” can be highly effective, as well as politically 
viable, helping to induce eco-efficient development. 
Such packages should be further considered also on the 
international policy arena (see item 4 below). However, 
combinations of policies interact in complex ways and 
these interactions are typically not well understood, 
requiring careful systems analysis and policy evaluation 
(see item 5 below). Furthermore, it is necessary to 
carefully analyse the implications for SME’s that 
struggle under administrative burdens, and avoid the 
common trap of designing governance with only large 
corporations in mind.
IntERnAtIonAl CooPERAtIon AnD 
CARBon PRICInG
If Europe is to benefit from being a leader in the eco-
efficient economy, the economic globalisation process 
needs clearer and more widely agreed rules, both for 
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socio-economic and environmental objectives such as 
climate change mitigation. The international agenda 
is critical to enable a European eco-efficient economy 
(not least considering Europe’s modest share of global 
greenhouse gas emissions) but is often played down 
in eco-efficiency discussions. Furthermore, although 
globalisation is a real opportunity for Europe, opening 
for new markets and new product developments, it can 
also become a serious problem if rules and standards 
are significantly different in different parts of the world. 
The core issue is to develop an effective global price on 
greenhouse gas emissions, and to assist emerging and 
developing economies to participate in a pricing regime. 
Ultimately, firm and consumer behaviour is determined 
by cost, and a level playing field for greenhouse gas 
costing is needed. This requires integration of policies 
across traditionally separate fields such as development 
assistance, trade & investment, and international 
climate negotiations. Steps have already been taken in 
this direction but much remains to be done in removing 
institutional barriers for coordinated policymaking 
between for example government departments and 
between Commission services. 
3. The EU needs to push the development towards 
a global price on greenhouse gas emissions. One 
approach is by way of an expansion of the Emissions 
Trading System (ETS) internationally, or by linking 
equivalent systems. Tested and conceptually proven in 
its pilot phase in Europe, ETS appears worthwhile to 
export as a governance approach. The EU must actively 
engage first with the US towards linking the carbon 
markets, in a first step working together on design 
elements to ensure compatibility of the two systems 
that would enable future linking and further movements 
towards an OECD-wide carbon market, and further on 
to a global accord. EU must assist developing countries 
in knowledge transfer and learning from experiences 
as well as creating institutions that have the capacity 
to govern such systems, including monitoring and 
reporting. Ultimately, however, the possibilities to 
develop a global pricing mechanism are contingent on 
ancillary measures of support, capacity building and 
incentives for emerging economies, which brings us to 
the next point.
4. The EU needs to assist and induce emerging 
economies to make substantive commitments. 
This involves findings ways to contributing to global 
greenhouse gas pricing which enables their economies 
and welfare to grow. To enable this, policy discussions 
must be broadened from global burden sharing 
negotiations to questions about technology transfer, 
financial assistance, opportunities for developing 
countries to access European markets with eco-
efficient materials and technologies (e.g. solar energy 
technologies or biofuels), through to international 
political and economic relations more generally. 
The sectoral crediting mechanism recently proposed 
could play an important role in these discussions. A 
more vigorous pursuit of international technological 
cooperation involves R&D and innovation financing, 
both for technologies that are expensive and distant, 
but also for technologies and technical systems such as 
for instance efficient energy and transport solutions to 
be adapted to developing country needs and demands. 
Another category is the realization of technology 
standards and agreements to optimise and enhance 
the use of current technologies. Here, activities with 
neighbouring countries to enhance the compatibility 
between energy infrastructures are important. At the 
same time, EU policymakers need to consider sticks 
as well as carrots – preparing for different scenarios 
and determine its response for each. An unchartered 
way forward is to more strongly integrate policies and 
negotiations across traditionally separate sectors, such 
as trade, development cooperation and climate change, 
and develop “policy packages” at the international level 
much like the EU has done in the energy and chemicals 
sectors domestically. For instance, EU commitments 
to carbon pricing are not mirrored in the near future 
in the US and in emerging economic powers such as 
China and India, it cannot be ruled out that a further 
integration of climate and trade policy is needed, for 
instance through the application of price adjustments for 
globally-exposed industries that have high mitigation 
costs, such as iron & steel, chemicals, and paper & pulp. 
The principal argument is clear: the core reason for 
global market liberalisation is to create a level playing 
field for industries to compete on equal terms. If Europe 
imposes restrictions and costs on its domestic industries 
to mitigate climate change, this creates a distortion of 
the playing field. There is no doubt, from ecological, 
economic and political perspectives, that greenhouse gas 
emissions must be priced one way or the other – either 
at the time of production, distribution or consumption 
of goods and services. Policy packages reflecting this 
fundamental insight could be more explicit in Europe’s 
policies towards multilateral negotiations.
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A SyStEmS APPRoACh FoR InFoRmED 
PolICy DEBAtES
European and national policy makers do often not 
know quite enough about the sectors and industries 
they are intervening in, nor about the effects of different 
strategies and policies, in particular when they interact. 
This is nothing new, and the quest for more evidence-
based policy making is nowadays widely agreed upon 
in European policy making. The Commission’s own 
attempt at enhancing the evidence base in the regulatory 
process, the impact assessment (IA) procedure, has 
been operational for several years. Many national 
governments have followed suit and put in place similar 
systems. However, despite the strong commitment on 
paper to enhance the evidence base for policy-making, 
current assessment practices and the role they play in 
decision making is quite weak.147 The complexity of 
advancing the eco-efficient economy requires a more 
active use of a stronger evidence base. Two principal 
agendas can be advanced. 
5. The EU should make high-quality policy 
assessments and other forms of evidence gathering 
routine. These need to take a systemic approach to 
the eco-efficient economy, covering competitiveness, 
climate, employment, and resource use as objective 
functions along with the now-established regulatory 
burden assessments. These assessments must make 
use of advanced methods and tools to understand the 
systems implications of different policy alternatives, 
including both spill-over effects across sectors as well 
as interactions between policies. Methods and tools, 
including integrated assessment models, multi-criteria 
analysis, and advanced economic models, do exist and 
have been developed and tested in European Framework 
Programmes 5-7, but are currently not used much to 
inform decision making. Analyses, including model-
based approaches, need to link micro- and macro-levels 
of the eco-efficient economy, from the level of specific 
technologies up to the societal level. Also, systemic 
studies of technological innovation systems are needed. 
Strategies should be designed on the basis of clear and 
detailed analysis of the innovation process for each 
system, to determine which developmental functions 
147 Hertin, M., J. Turnpenny, et al. (2009). “Rationalising 
the policy mess?  Ex ante policy assessment and the utili-
sation of knowledge in the policy process.” Environment 
and Planning A 41(5): 1185-1200.
are in need of strengthening, what kind of governance is 
needed, and what roles different actors can play. 
6. The EU needs to develop institutional platforms 
where the evidence can be taken up, interpreted 
and learned from. Although not a specific topic in 
this study, it is well know that knowledge and evidence 
to support policy making have tended to be ill-timed 
and often inconsequential, due to being “tagged on” to 
policy making rather than underpinning it. Institutional 
barriers to using systems-oriented knowledge in policy 
making must be alleviated. Assessments must be given 
enough time to deliver robust and relevant results, and 
they need to promote openness and actively facilitate 
participation of concerned stakeholders and independent 
expertise. These platforms, needed at both European and 
national levels, should promote learning between policy 
makers, experts and stakeholders about the systems 
implications of different governance alternatives but 
would also contribute to much broader aims, such as 
facilitating better policy coordination between sectoral 
departments, facilitating stakeholder interactions and 
encouraging civic debate. Systems such as committees 
that have been deployed in many Member States may 
be models to build upon.
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